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THE OATH IN CIVIL LAW [COUNTRIES:
CoNTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS
The Party Oath in Civil Cases
THE oath has survived as a decisive ordeal, rather than as one more pro-
bative factor of testimony, in some civil-law countries in the form of the
"party oath." This oath does not attest to the truth of testimony, but is an
institution sui generis derived from the Roman and canon law.1 Indeed,
the same countries which utilize the party oath do not accept a party's testi-
mony, which they presume to be biased.2 The rules applicable to -the party
oath are naturally different from those which govern sworn testimony. The party
oath is not compulsory, although failure to take it can mean an unfavorable
decision.
Only one party may swear to any one issue. The statement to be sworn
to is formulated in advance with utmost precision, and must not be departed
from by the oath taker. Only the contents of this prepared statement are
covered by the oath.3 And once a judgment has been rendered on the basis
of a party oath, even conviction for perjury affords no ground for reopening
the case.
4
As in the Roman and the canon law, there are two forms of the party oath.
*Part two of a study of the oath institution. Part one-tracing the oath's background
and history-appears in the present volume at page 1329.
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1. See Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1338, 1345 (1959).
2. See, e.g., CODIcE DI PRoCEDURA crviLE art. 246 (Italy 1940) [hereinafter cited as
ITAL. CODICE PROC. CIVILE], in IL NUOVO CODICE DI PRocEDuRA. cIVIxE 47 (Garrone ed.
1951) (excluding as witnesses persons who have an interest in the case which might cause
their participation in the trial).
3. 'See 7 PLANIOL, TRAiT. PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 1052 (2d ed. Ripert
1954) ; CODE DE PROCEDURE civmE art. 120 (Fr. 48th ed. Dalloz 1952) [hereinafter cited
as FPL CoE PRoC. crv.].
4. In France, the party against whom the oath was taken cannot intervene in the
perjury prosecution as a civil party or claim damages. See 7 PLANIOL, op. cit. SUpra note
3, at 1050. In Italy, such a party can claim damages in case of conviction. CoDICE CIvILE
art. 2738, para. 2 (Italy Franchi & Feroci ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as ITAT. CODICE
CIVILE].
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In the form of the ordeal-like "decisory oath," a conclusive oath is tendered by
one party to the other.5 If the offeree neither takes the oath nor tenders it
back to the offeror, he necessarily loses the case.6 Moreover he cannot tender
back if the facts in dispute are personal to him.7 Although this procedure
is rationalized by reference to its transactional character, and is said to be
based on freedom and equality of the two parties,8 the element of compulsion
in the offer is obvious.9 The oath may be tendered as to any relevant issue
that will dispose of the case, including facts which may incriminate or dis-
grace the offeree. 10
The other form, the "suppletory oath," is reminiscent of the ancient con-
ception of mathematical ratios of proof. The judge, in his discretion, may
tender this oath ex officio to either party-usually the one in whom the judge
has greater confidence--on the theory that when the evidence thus far sub-
mitted is entitled to some weight, but is insufficient to form a judicial "per-
suasion," the oath will afford the missing portion of proof.1 In France,
neither trial nor appellate judge is bound by the oath, and the oath taker
is not necessarily victorious.1 2 In Italy, however, the judge has no discretion,
but must decide in favor of the oath taker or against a party who refuses
an offer of the party oath.' 3
The alleged advantage of party-oath procedure is that it affords a method
of disposing of an otherwise insoluble case by resort to the parties, within
systems which render party "testimony" unavailable. Some measure of trust-
worthiness is said to be provided by the requirement that a party cannot offer
to take a decisory oath himself but can only tender it to the other party in
reliance on the latter's truthfulness under oath, and the practice of judges in
tendering a suppletory oath only to that party who is "closer to proof." Above
5. CODE CIVIL art. 1357, No. 10 (Fr. 57th ed. Dalloz 1,958) [hereinafter cited as FR.
CODE CIVIL] ; ITAL. CODIcE ciVILE art. 2736, No. 1.
6. FP. CODE CIVIL arts. 1361, 1364.
7. FR. CODE CIVIL art. 1362; ITAL. CODICE CiviLE art. 2739, para. 2.
8. See 7 PLANIOL, op. cit. sipra note 3, at 1049-50, Nos. 1573-74.
9. 2 ENCYCLoPiEDIE DALLoZ, RPERTOIRE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE ET COMIERCIALE Serennt
No. 5, at 885 (1956).
10. 7 PLAmOL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1053, No. 1579.
11. FR. CODE CIVIL art. 1367; ITA. CoDIcE cIILE art. 2736, No. 2. If the judge
has already formed a persuasion, he has the duty of rendering judgment accordingly.
Conversely he cannot tender the oath to a party when there is no proof at all. See ibid.
The available evidence or "commencement of proof" must conform to general evidentiary
requirements. Thus, a presumption will constitute a "commencement of proof" only
when proof can be made by testimony, but not when there must be "commencement of
proof" in writing.
12. See Boissol v. -cole secondaire d'Auteuil, Cour de Cassation (Ch. soc.), May 4,
1944, [1945] Dalloz Jurisprudence [hereinafter cited as D.] 87 (Fr.); Tobler et Stauffler
v. Ppoux Vetter et Louis Gerber, Cour de Cassation (Ch. req.), April 29, 1933, [1933]
Sirey Recueil G~n~ral I. 216 (Fr.).
13. See 1 CARNELUrI, ISTITUZIONI DEL NUOVO PROCESSO CIVILE ITALIANO 405 (3d rev.
ed. 1942), inferring this from ITAL. CoDICE ciVILE art. 2736, No. 2; art. 2738, para. 1.
1528 [Vol. 68:1527
THE OATH
all, the procedure has been praised for making the result foreseeable by the
parties and for facilitating the judicial function.
14
But the procedure has been vigorously criticised for its artificiality and
almost mechanical operation. The rigidity of the statement to be sworn, the
difficulty of formulating it in such a fashion as to exclude mental reservations,
the practical impossibility of determining on any given issue which of the
parties is "closer to proof," and, finally, the fact that the device tends to
reduce judicial responsibility, have been grounds for attack.15 Thus, while
the party oath has been gaining strength in Italy,16 Austria paced a move-
ment for its elimination.
Anglo-American procedure has served as a pattern of reform. There, the
party is treated as a witness and admitted to testimonial oath. The testimonial
oath of a party, however, is comparable to the oath of the accused in criminal
cases, which civil-law countries have overwhelmingly and unexceptionally
rejected, because of the conflict of conscience and the perjury danger thought
to be incident to its use. Additionally, administration of an oath to two ad-
versary parties in support of contentions which necessarily contradict each
other, and of which one is likely to be perjurious, has been found objection-
able by the civil law.' 7 Doubts have also been expressed as to the wisdom
of administering an oath in advance of knowledge of the nature and probable
credibility of party statements.' 8 As a result of such conflicting policy con-
siderations, several countries have adopted a compromise solution to replace
the party oath. Although varying from country to country, the compromise
procedure consists in substance of an unsworn "party hearing" (Partei-
vernelhmung), with subsequent discretionary administration of the oath on
any particular issue to only one party. 19 A tendency exists to dispense with
14. See 2 POLLAx, SYSTEM DES 6STERREIc HISCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECiaTs 687 (2d rev.
ed. 1931).
15. Ibid.
16. This is evident in recent rulings of the Corte di Cassazione, whereby "the sup-
pletory oath may be tendered even on the basis of simple clues (indizi) which do not
satisfy such requirements of gravity, precision and consistency as to have the value
of a true and proper presumption (and which moreover would render superfluous the
very oath)." Decision of Nov. 13, 1957, Tribunale Firenze, 110 Giurisprudenza Italiana
682, 686 (Italy) (citing Corte di Cassazione decision of July 11, 1957, No. 2773).
17. Permanent Commissions of the Upper and Lower Chamber of the Austrian
Parliament, Joint Report of June 5, 1895 (Geineinsamer Bericht der Permnenzcom-
misson des Herrenhaiues und des Permanenzausschuses des Abgeordnetenhauses iiber
die Civilpro-cessordnung, die urisdictionsmorm, sowie die daazi gehirenden Einfiihriatgs-
gesetze), in 2 MATERIALIEN ZU DEN NEUEN 6STERREICHISCHEN CIVILPROZESSGESFTZEN 310,
324-26 (1897).
18. The Joint Report, ibid., rejected imposition of penal sanctions on preliminary
unsworn statements which'were made by both parties.
19. A beginning was made by the Law Concerning Procedure in Minor Matters,
April 27, 1873, [,1873] Reichsgesetzblatt [hereinafter cited R.G. BI.] 249 (Aus.) After
considerable modification in a series of drafts, the present Austrian system was enacted,
forming part of the ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (Code of Civil Procedure [hereinafter cited as
1959] 1529
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the oath after "party hearing" whenever possible. Nevertheless, many rules
applied to the "party hearing" and the posthearing oath are traceable to the
now abandoned "party oath."
In the Austrian and German "party hearing," the party declares "like
a witness," not "as a witness. '20 This distinction is meaningful, for, while
the party has an obligation to state the truth even without being sworn, this
duty is not subject to penal sanction, as is the corresponding duty of the
witness. 2 ' Nor is unjustified failure or refusal to appear, to declare, to answer
Aus. Z.P.O.]), [1895] RG. BI. 365, [1945] Staatsgesetzblatt No. 188, [1946] Bundes-
gesetzblatt [hereinafter cited as B.G. B1.] 149, as amended, OsT-MREIcniscHEs RECHT 330
(Aus. 5th ed. Andreas & .Guttenfeld 1952) ; see 2 PoLLAx, op. cit. supra note 14, § 136,
at 686-88.
The Austrian system, in turn, served as a pattern in many other countries. The "party
hearing" was introduced in Japan (Law of Civil Procedure of 1898); Hungary (Law
of 1911); Zurich (Code of Civil Procedure 1874, now Code of Civil Procedure of
April 13, 1913); Norway (Law of Procedure of August 13, 1915); Denmark (Lan, of
April 11, 1916); Sweden (Law of Procedure of 1942) ; Finland (Law of July 29, 1948) ;
and in the Swiss Cantons Uri and Thurgau (Laws of Procedure of 1928). See RoSEN-
mERo, LEHBtUCH DES DEursCIHE ZIvlLuPozESSC1CaTs 561 (6th rev. ed. 1954). Of course,
there are many variations and independent contributions in these laws. The most sig-
nificant variation in the present context is the total abandonment of the oath in Zurich.
Contrary to Austria and Germany, Zurich, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland use
the "party hearing" in a manner resembling the Anglo-American practice-as a principal
rather than a subsidiary means of proof.
20. ROSENBmG, op. cit. sipra note 19, at 561 ; 2 POLLAx, op. cit. spra note 14, § 136,
at 688.
21. The question of whether a party in civil litigation should be required to tell
the truth has been the subject of vigorous controversy for many decades. Under the
rule of the "common law" (gemeines Recht) in Germany, i.e., until the enactment of
the Civil Code, the general opinion was that untruthful allegations and denials of parties
in civil cases did not constitute criminal fraud. In 1908 Konrad Hellwig began a campaign
against the so-called "procedural lie," his term for the undue extension of litigation
by production of untruthful statements and unjustified denial of true statements. He
recommended that such conduct be punishable as fraud. A provision incorporated in a
1908 draft of an amendment of the law of civil procedure, imposing upon the parties
the duty of making "complete and truthful" declarations, was struck at the instance
of the Bar. Hellwig reacted by an attack against lawyers. He claimed they would tell
their farmer-clients: "You better tell me the truth; I will take care of the lying." Hugo
Neumann and Richard Schmidt came to the defense of lawyers. Schmidt said: "The
lie in litigation, to be sure, is not ethically permissible or even commendable; but it is
ethically indifferent--exactly as anywhere else in human life-also outside of legal life-
where man's conscience, in the struggle for free self-realization, compels him to lie."
While Binding joined Hellwig, Phillippsborn took an intermediary position. He pointed
out that there is considerable doubt regarding the question to whom a litigant owes the
alleged duty of truthfulness, to the court, to the adversary or to both.
The rules regarding the burden of proof presuppose that a litigant has no duty of
complete truthfulness. However, as to matters within his knowledge, the party cannot,
when asked, untruthfully deny such knowledge. See Adam, Die Liige im. Recht, in Dm
LOGE 180-82 (Lipmann & Plaut ed. 1927). The duty of truthfulness is imposed upon the
parties by Aus. Z.P.O. § 178, which provides that "each party shall in his allegations state
1530 [Vol. 63:1,527
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any particular question, or to take the oath directly punishable; but it is
subject to judicial evaluation as part of the evidence.2 While Austria grants
a party the right to refuse testimony on the same grounds that are available
to a witness,23 Germany does not.2 In both, the "party hearing" serves only
as a subsidiary means of evidence; it is permitted only in the absence of full
proof when no other method of obtaining further evidence is available.
25
In Austria, both parties, after being admonished that they may be put on
oath, are initially heard regarding the same evidentiary issue.26 The court
in its discretion may then impose the oath on one or the other party if "the
result of the unsworn questioning is not sufficient to convince the court of
the truth or untruth of the facts to be proven. '27 Rules regarding the burden
of proof do not control the court's discretion. The circumstances appearing
in the proceedings and the greater credibility of a party are usually decisive,
but, if these guides are not available, the party not having the burden of proof
in accordance with truth, fully and definitely . . .all the factual circumstances required
in a given case to justify his motions." Following this provision, the German ZivilPROZES-
SORDNUNG (Code of Civil Procedure [hereinafter cited GEL Z.P.O.]) § 138, paras. 1, 3,
consol. text, Law of Sept. 20, 1950, [1950] B.G. Bl. 533 (Ger. Fed. Rep.), introduced a
similar duty of truthfulness. The scope of this duty, however, as well as the consequences
of untruthfulness are highly controversial. A procedural lie may constitute criminal fraud,
provided that all elements of that crime are fulfilled. German STRAFGESETZBUCH (Penal
Code [hereinafter cited as Gmn. ST. G.B.]) § 263, Law of Sept. 1, 1953, [1953] B.G. Bl.
103 (Ger. Fed. Rep.); see DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FUR REcHTSwiSSENSCHAFT, DAS
ZMvILPROZSSRECHT DER DEuTscHEN DEuOKRATISCHEN1 REPUDBLIK 38 (Nathan ed. 1957);
RoSENDERG, op. cit. supra note 19, at 276. A person damaged by an untruthful allegation
may sue for damages, provided that such suit is not barred by res judicata. Ibid. Even
more controversial than "truthfulness" is the concept of "completeness." See LENT,
ZIVMILROZESSRECHT, EIN STUDIENBUCH § 26, at 66-67 (7th rev. ed. 1957).
The problem of independent criminal responsibility for an untruthful unsworn party
statement is particularly intricate in Austria, where the crime of false testimony is couched
in terms of "fraud." False party allegations and defenses in civil procedure have been
held not to constitute "fraud," simply because the court decides on the basis of proof and
not on the basis of party allegations. See 2 RiT-LER, LEHRBucH DES 6STEREICHISCHEN
STRAFRECHTS § 42, at 133-34 (1938) (collecting authorities).
22. Aus. Z.P.O. § 381; Gmn. Z.P.O. §§ 446, 453, 454, para. 1. Aus. Z.P.O. § 380, para.
3, expressly bars use of compulsory measures in order to bring about the party's appear-
ance or declaration.
23. Aus. Z.P.O. § 380, para. 1. Of course, this privilege does not extend to refusal
of testimony on the ground that it would cause the declarant or one of his close relatives
"an immediate financial disadvantage"-though such refusal is available to a witness.
Aus. Z.P.O. § 321, para. 1, No. 2.
24. RoSENBERG, op. cit. sipra note 19, at 361.
25. See Aus. Z.P.O. § 371, para. 2; Gum. Z.P.O. § 445. The reason for permitting
the parties to be heard only as a last resort measure is distrust of the parties, who are
deemed necessarily biased. See 2 POLLAK, op. cit. supra note 14, § 136, at 689-90; LENT,
op. cit. supra note 21, § 56, at 151.
26. Aus. Z.P.O. § 376; see aDIE JURIsDIKTIONSNORM UND DIE ZIVLPROZESSORDNtNG §
371 comment (now Aus. Z.P.O. § 376) (Hermann ed. 1937).
27. Aus. Z.P.O. § 377, para. 1.
1959] 1531
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is normally sworn .2  The court may limit the oath to a part of the testimony,
or a particular statement, or determine the form of the statement,2 as long
as the sworn declaration does not go beyond the former unsworn one.30 The
oath cannot simply refer back to the prior unsworn statement; rather, it
must be followed by a new hearing "under oath," in which prior statements
may be repeated.3 1 Administration of the oath requires a special order of
proof (Beweisurteil), issued by the court en banc, under which a continuance
may be granted to give the party to be put on oath time for deliberation .
2
Austrian judges have managed to reduce oath taking to a minimum with a
skill which is the object of admiration in other countries.33
In Germany, clear survivals of the old "party oath" appear on the very
threshold of the party hearing. Burden-of-proof rules largely determine which
party will be "heard." The party with the burden of proof is free to propose
only that his adversary be heard,3 4 but may be heard himself only in the
discretion of the court, and with consent of the adversary.35 The court may
order a party hearing of either or 'both parties on its own motion only when
some evidence is already available,36 and the court has examined and affirmed
the credibility of the party to be heard.37 As a rule, the party is heard with-
out oath. But the court must order the oath to be taken if it has not been
persuaded by the unsworn declaration but would give credit to a sworn one.38
The oath is taken after the testimony (Nacheid), and refers back to the prior
hearing.3 9 It may be limited to that part of the declaration which is essential
to the judgment to be rendered.40 Even when both parties have been heard,
only one may be sworn as to any given issue.41 The appellate court may
28. 2 POLLAK, op. cit. mtpra note 14, § 136, at 690-91.
29. Aus. Z.P.O. § 377, para. 2. 36. DEuTScHER JURISTENTAG, VERHANDLUNGEN vol. 2,
at 638, 733-34 (1931) (cited in ROSENBERG, op. cit. mipra note 19, § 121, at 565), recom-
mended a similar provision for witnesses.
30. WOLFF, GRuNDRISS DES OSTEnMCIHISCHEN ZILPROZESSRECHTs 326 (2d rev. ed.
1947).
31. Aus. Z.P.O. § 377, para. 2.
32. Aus. Z.P.O. §§ 378-79.
33. ROSENBERG, op. cit. supra note 19, § 121, at 566.
34. GER. Z.P.O. § 445, para. 1.
35. GER. Z.P.O. § 447. The highly technical complex of rules governing this procedure
has been the object of criticism from almost all commentators. RoSFNBERG, op. cit. supra
note 19, § 121, at 564; LENT, op. cit. supra note 21, § 56, at 152 (deploring that only one
party may be heard upon party motion).
36. GER. Z.P.O. § 448.
37. See ROSENBERG, op. cit. supra note 19, § 121, at 564 (collecting authorities).
38. GER. Z.P.O. § 452, para. 1. Though couched in terms of "the court may," this
provision is generally interpreted to mean "must." See ROSENBERG, op. Cit. supra note 19,
§ 121, at 565; BAUMBACH, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 452, comment at 764 (24th rev. and
supp. ed. Lauterbach 1956) [hereinafter cited as BAUMBAcH-LAUTERBACH].
39. See GmE. Z.P.O. § 452, para. 2.
40. ROSENBERG, op. cit. supra note 19, § 121, at 565.
41. Gm. Z.P.O. § 452, para. 1, sentence 2.
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administer the oath to the other party after finding that the first oath was
inadmissible, but this is beyond the discretion of the trial court. 42 As in
Austria, the decision to administer the oath requires a special order.4 3
The Oath of the Accused and the Suspect
In no civil-law country is the oath administered to the accused in a
criminal case.44 When an accused or a person charged is erroneously put
on oath, he usually enjoys immunity from prosecution for perjury or false
testimony.45 In France, this immunity is justified on the grounds that only
witnesses can be sworn and that no one may be a witness in his own cause.
46
Abolition of the oath must be considered in context with the established
practice of interrogating the accused, as well as the suspect. While several
codes provide that, at the investigation stage, the person charged be admon-
ished to tell the truth,4 7 disobedience of the admonition lacks a legal sanc-
42. ROSENBERG, op. cit. supra note 19, § 121, at 565-66.
43. GE. Z.P.O. § 452, para. 1; see ROSENBERG, Op. cit. supra note 19, § 121, at 567.
44. The accused's oath, in all its forms, was abolished in France in 1789 and in Germany
in 1877. 1 GARRA uD, TRArr THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE Er DE
PROCEDUE PANAIE 528-29 (1907). It is expressly prohibited in the Spanish Code of Criminal
Procedure. LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CRIMINAL [hereinafter cited as SPAN. LEY ENJuIc.
CrtiM.] art. 387 (Spain 1881), in 1 MIAJADA, MANUAL DE FORMULARIOS PENALES 444 (2d ed.
1956).
45. 2 ENCYCLOPZDIE DALLOZ, REPERTOIRE DE DROIT CRIMINEL ET DE PROCEDURE P]NALE
Faux Tnwignage No. 11, at 30 (1954).
46. Ibid. But such persons are subject to responsibility if, in the course of an interroga-
tion, they use the name of a third person in such a manner as to cause or to be susceptible
of causing inscription of the latter's conviction in the criminal record (casier). CODE DE
PROCE DURE PENALE [hereinafter cited as FR. CODE PROC. PANALE] art. 780 (Fr. 1958), Loi
No. 57-1426, Dec. 31, 1957, Portant institution d'un code de procedure p6nale (titre
pr~liminaire et livre ler), [1958] Journal Officiel 258, as amended and completed, Ordon-
nance No. 58-1296, Dec. 23, 1958, Modifiant et compl6tant le code de procedure p~nale,
[1958] Journal Officiel 11711 (Fr.). This article corresponds to CODE D'INSTRUCTION
CRIMNELLE [hereinafter cited as FR. CODE INSTM. CalM.] art. 598, as amended, Ordinance
of Aug. 13, 1945 (Fr. 50th ed. Dalloz 1958), now repealed. The new Code has added a fine
to the former penalty of imprisonment.
47. See, e.g., SPAN. LEY ENJUMC. caIm. art. 387; 15STERREICHISCHE STRAFPROZESSORD-
NUNG (Code of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter cited as Aus. ST. P.O.]) § 199, para. 1
(Aus. 1945), in OSTERREICHISCHES RECHT, op. cit. supra note 19, at 252. A person is a
"Beschuldigter" (person charged) only after a charge (Anklageschrift), or a motion
for initiation of an investigation (Voruntermtchung) has been filed against him. An
"Angeklagler" (accused) is a person against whom a trial has been ordered. Aus. ST. P.O.
§ 38. At trial, the presiding judge admonishes the accused to pay "attention" to the accusa-
tion and the course of proceedings. Aus. ST. P.O. § 240. At this stage, the accused is no
longer being directed to be truthful. The difference is explained by the fact that investiga-
tory proceedings have a limited "inquisitorial character," whereas trial proceedings are
fully accusatory. See LOHSING, OSTERRECHISCHES STRAFPROZESSRECHT 319-20 (4th ed.
rev. & supp. Serini 1952) [hereinafter cited as LoHSING-SEmNI].
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tion.4' Thus he may have no "legal duty" to tell the truth.40 Nevertheless, the
admonition may be effective, since, at this stage, he is often without legal ad-
vice and unaware of the absence of a legal duty.
Interrogation is avowedly intended only to give the accused an opportunity
to refute the accusation. 0 But this "chance to explain" is often quite mean-
ingless.51 In fact, it is common knowledge that interrogation is actually used
to secure confessions or admissions. 52 Subject to this important qualification,
48. Aus. ST. P.O. § 202 prohibits the use of any promises, ruses, or threats to induce
the person charged to make "confessions or other definite statements." See LoHsING-
SENi 316 (collecting authorities).
In Germany, even under the old Military Criminal Code of 1872, a soldier-defendant
before a military tribunal could lie with impunity, for this was not considered lying to a
superior in matters of service. See Adam, Die Liige im Recht, in DIE LOGE 158, 179
(Lipmann & Plaut ed. 1927). And the accused is not any longer subject to "penalties for
lying" (Liigenstrafen), which, after abolition of torture, had served as its substitute. voN
HzrPm, DER DEUTSCHE SmRAMOZESS 277 (1941).
49. On the accused's "right to lie," see Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal
Cases, 69 HAgv. L. REv. 683, 696 n.54 (1956).
50. In Germany, STnRAPROZESSORNUNG (Code of Criminal Procedure [herein-
after cited as Gn. ST. P.O.]) §§ 136, 243, para. 3, Law of Sept. 12, 1950, [1949-
1950] B.G. B1. 631 (Ger. Fed. Rep.), provides for giving "the accused an opportunity of
removing the grounds of suspicion which exist against him and of asserting facts which
are favorable to him." In France, the repealed FiL CODE INSTE. cRIM. art. 405 provided
that "examination" of the accused shall begin immediately after the constitution of the
jury, but decisional law and commentators agreed that "examie" was not to be synonymous
with "interrogatoire," and meant rather, generally, the taking of evidence. 2 ENCYCLo-
PtDIE DALLoz, REPERTOnR DE DROIT CRIMINEL ET DE pROCtDURE PANALE Instraction a
I'audience No. 519, at 196, 226 (1954).
FR. CODE INST. cainm. arts. 319 (1), (3) provided that after the testimony of each witness
the judge shall ask the accused whether he wishes to reply to what has been just said
against him, and that he may ask him for explanations which are necessary to the ascer-
tainment of the truth. See also FR. CODE INSTR cRim. art. 327. The new F. CODE PROC.
PANALE art. 328, however, now specifically provides that the president of the court of assizes
shall "interrogate (interroge) the accused and receive his statements." See also FL CODE
PROC. PENALE art. 442. There is no provision corresponding to the former FR. CODE INST.
cam. art. 319, para. 1, for asking the accused whether he wishes to reply to what has been
just said against him. Nor has the provision of FL CODE INSTR. carm, art. 319, para 2,
which authorized the accused or his counsel to state "against the witness as well as against
his testimony everything that might be useful for the defense of the accused," been adopted.
At present, the accused or his counsel may merely put questions to the witness through
the medium of the president, FL. CODE PROC. PtNAI.E art. 332, but neither the accused nor his
counsel has a right to comment on the answers, see Chapar, Les nodifications apporties
par le code de procddure phale an fonctionnement des cours d'assises, [1959] RECuEL
DJ.Loz (HEBDomADAI)-CHoNI uE 35, 38.
51. See Gargon, Faut-il modifier les loi sur l'instruction contradictoire?, 52 REvuE
PRNITENTIAIRE ET DE DROIT PtNqAL 137, 142 (1928) (report made at the meeting of the
Socidti G6n6rale des Prisons et de Lgislation Criminelle on July 6, 1928).
52. And in France, judgment based on improper evidence is not necessarily void. The
defect "may be cured where the judge declares that, apart from such evidence, other items
of evidence produced were sufficient to enable him to arrive at the finding." Case of
d'Agostin, Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), Dec. 12, 1951, [1952] D. 157, 161 (Fr.).
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however, the civil law undoubtedly affords the accused a privilege to meet
the judge's interrogation with silence or even lies. 5 The fact that the accused
is not permitted to be put on oath relieves him of the dilemma of perjury
or confession. In this sense, he is undoubtedly "freer" than is the accused
in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
In addition to the "accused"--the person against whom trial proceedings
have been ordered opened-and the "person charged"-one against whom a
public complaint has been filed 5 -- Austria, Germany, as well as other civil-
law jurisdictions, bar the mere "suspect" from taking the oath.5 In general,
"suspect" is a broad concept. It is not regarded as limited to the statutory
notion of complicity, and one may be "suspected" of any part of "the entire
historical event within which the actus reus [before the court] was material-
ized .... " 6 as well as of the very offense being adjudicated. In the Austrian
provision, the "suspect" is mentioned together with the "person proven" to
have been guilty of the offense under investigation; and in the German
provision, the "suspect" is mentioned together with the person "already sen-
tenced" for such conduct 7 The context of these oath prohibitions seems
to indicate a legislative intent to protect the declarant not only against the
danger of criminal prosecution for perjury, but also against being required
53. This "right" to silence is of questionable value. See Seibert, Der Adainsprozess laid
wir, 10 NEUE JuRIsTIscHE WocHnaNscHriFT [hereinafter cited as N.J.W.] 779 (1957).
Commenting on the English trial of Dr. John Bodkin Adams, Seibert noticed with amaze-
ment that during seventeen days of his trial before a jury the accused opened his mouth
only once, saying "I plead not guilty." Seibert added: "In this country [Germany] the
accused is not bound either to make a statement. But absolute silence is not advisable, for
it may be taken as basis for an inference of animosity against the law or even of a conscious-
ness of guilt [Gm ST. P.O. § 261 (free evaluation of the evidence)]."
54. See GER. ST. P.O. § 157. Compare Aus. ST. P.O. § 38.
55. Aus. ST. P.O. § 170, No. 1, enumerates among the persons who "must not be sworn
under sanction of nullity of the oath," those "who are themselves . .. under suspicion
of having committed or participated in the criminal act with regard to which they
are being questioned." Gm. ST. P.O. § 60, No. 3, prohibits the swearing of persons "who
are suspected ... of [committing] the act which is the subject of investigation or of
participation therein."
56. Decision of Dec. 3, 1957, Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, 11 N.J.W. 231 (Ger.
Fed. Rep.). The court added: "It is essential that the witness participated in a criminal
manner in the act under investigation in the same direction as the accused."
In Austria, a witness "is not suspected of having committed the act by the mere fact that
a suspicion has been voiced against him; he becomes a suspect only when the court, in its
discretionary evaluation of the circumstances of the concrete case, declares the suspicion to
be well founded." LoHsiNG-SEmiI 292.
In Germany, the Bundesgerichtshof held that a person is not a suspect until the prose-
cuting agency has opened proceedings against him. Decision of Oct. 18, 1956, Bundesgerichts-
hof (IV. Strafsenat), 10 N.J.W. 230 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). This holding is inconsistent with
rulings in other cases, including that of the same Senate, in which a witness in a traffic case
was treated as a "suspect."
See notes 59-61 infra and accompanying text.
57. Aus. ST. P.O. § 170, No. 1; Gm. ST. P.O. § 60, No. 3.
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to relate "events in which he played a more or less odious role."' s Recent
German decisions, however, stress other reasons for this rule. Thus, the Great
Criminal Senate of the Bundesgerichtshof, in 1958, stated that an oath may
not be administered to a witness suspected of having committed a crime in
issue, although not accused of it, because of the impediments likely to be
placed on the finding of truth by his sworn testimony. 59 The Bundesgerichts-
hof (Fourth Criminal Senate) noted in 1957 that the legislature intended
to bar oath taking when it "does not increase the credibility of testimony of
a suspected witness and cannot remove his bias." 60 In this case, involving a
traffic violation, the court astutely pointed out that in such crimes it is often
a matter of chance whether a person becomes an accused or a witness. The
court further remarked that the accused might "find it difficult to understand
if he were to be convicted on the basis of the sworn testimony of the person
whom he regards as guilty and whose possible guilt was not clearly denied
by the court." 61
The Oath of the Witness in Crimiwl and Civil Cases
Although the oath practices of those legal systems which have retained the
oath of the witness are not uniform, certain generalizations are valid. Most
show the traditional preference for sworn testimony by classifying witnesses
58. SCHMIDT, LEHRKOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND ZUm GERiCHTS-
VERFASSUNGSGESF.TZ pt. 2, § 60, comment 16, at 144 (1952).
59. Decision of Jan. 21, 1958, Bundesgerichtshof (Grosser Strafsenat), 11 N.J.W. 557
(Ger. Fed. Rep.).
In German law the decision as to administration of the oath is made by the presiding
judge and, in the event of challenge, by the entire court. It is regarded as falling
within the scope of truth finding rather than merely procedural direction. See ScHmsor,
op. cit. supra note 58, pt. 2, at 140.
60. Decision of Jan. 9, 1957, Bundesgerichtshof (IV. Strafsenat), 10 N.J.W. 431
(Ger. Fed. Rep.) The court relied on a'statement of legislative policy as well as the
following court decisions of the Reichsgericht and the Bundesgerichtshof: Judgment of
Dec. 7, 1882, Reichsgericht (I. Strafsenat), 8 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Strafsachen [hereinafter cited as R.G. St.] 331, 332 (Ger.) (concerning persons suspected
of participation in the act charged); Judgment of Sept. 24, 1953, Bundesgerichtshof
(III. Strafsenat), 4 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen [hereinafter
cited as B.G.H. St.] 368, 371 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). 10 N.J.W. at 431, 432.
61. The court also pointed out that the witness "cannot be expected-if only in
view of the damage suit normally following in such cases-to be impartial toward the
accused in such cases." Id. at 432. The new FP. CODE PRoC PtNALE art. 105 also affords
a broad protection to any persons suspected of crime. It expressly prohibits judge-
investigators and police officers, under sanction of nullity, "to hear as witnesses
persons against whom there are grave and consistent (grave et concordantes) indications
of guilt, if such hearing would result in evasion of the safeguards of the defense." This
provision, in the version of the 1957 legislation, referred to "serious indications of guilt."
FR. CODE PROC. PENALE art. 104, in addition, grants witnesses a limited privilege against
"self-incrimination." When a complaint has been filed against the witness, the judge-
investigator is required to draw his attention to this fact and to advise him of his right
to refuse official testimony.
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into those who are required or permitted to be sworn and those who are
not admitted to oath,62 a classification based in part on a distrust of those
who comprise the latter group. 3 Further, witnesses usually must be sworn
under sanction of nullity of their testimony,6 4 and exemptions are restrictively
interpreted.6 Even when the court is accorded discretion to forego swearing
a witness, in certain cases unsworn testimony may not support a judgment.66
But some jurisdictions present significant departures from the traditional
cath pattern. The introduction of the crime of unsworn false testimony, dis-
cretionary rather than obligatory swearing, and administration of the oath
after, rather than prior to, the testimony are all basic innovations meriting
attention. The latter two procedures are intended to reduce the number of
oaths, particularly in minor cases, and thus enhance the significance of the
oath in the eyes of the public.67 The "posttestimonial oath" (Nacheid) func-
tions as a significant aid to proper exercise of the discretion to forego ad-
ministration of the oath, as well as affording a witness an opportunity to alter
his testimony without forcing him to admit perjury by retracting a sworn
statement. 8 While the legislative reforms mentioned here do not in them-
62. Persons not admitted to oath in French law are listed in CODE PtAL arts. 34,
No. 3; 42, No. 8 (Fr. 55th ed. Dalloz 1958) [hereinafter cited FR. CODE PPNAL];
FR. CODE PROC. PLNALE arts. 108, 335, 447, 448. In German law, see Gsa. ST. P.O. § 60;
GER. Z.P.O. § 393. See also Fa. CODE PROc. PkNALE art. 330; Fa- CODE PRoC. cirv. art. 262.
63. See, e.g., the statement of the German Bundesgerichtshof in Decision of Jan. 9,
1957, Bundesgerichtshof (IV. Strafsenat), 10 N.J.W. 431 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
64. See GER. ST. P.O. §§ 59, 61. But see Gms. Z.P.O. § 391. For the relevant French
provisions, see FR. CODE PROC. P NALE arts. 103, 331(2) ; FR. CODE PROC. civ. art. 262.
65. See text at notes 142-46 infra.
66. A passage from a recent decision of the Great Senate in Criminal Matters of
the German Bundesgerichtshof, Decision of Jan. 21, 1958, Bundesgerichtshof (Grosser
Strafsenat), 11 N.J.W. 557 (Ger. Fed. Rep.), is most enlightening:
According to [Gma. ST. P.O. § 261 (free evaluation of the evidence)], the finding
of truth is made by way of free evaluation of the evidence in the course of which
the evidentiary value of the testimony of witnesses is examined. Rules of proof
and exclusion of witnesses are foreign to the prevailing law of criminal procedure
(compare [GER. ST. P.O.] § 244 (3) [stating in pertinent part that a motion for
admission of proof is to be denied if the evidence is inadmissible, but that apart
from this, such motion may be denied only if .... (among other instances,) this
evidence is wholly inadequate"]). The danger which the testimony of suspected
witnesses presents for the finding of truth is met by the provisions prohibiting
the administration of an oath to witnesses who are suspected of having committed
the crime or who are related to the accused ([GmL ST. P.O.] §§ 60, No. 3; 61,
No. 2).
In the instances referred to by the court, the witness can be heard and his statement
may be used in the process of proof. But clearly, under the above authoritative judicial
interpretation, it is not proof of the same degree as a sworn testimony.
67. See voN HIPPEL, op. cit. supra note 48, at 402-04.
68. The "posttestimonial oath" has also existed in Danish law (Nach-Ed) since
1919. Danish CODE OF PRoc., Act No. 90, April 11, 1916, effective Oct. 1, 1919. Section
186 of this act, as amended by Act No. 300, June 30, 1922, § 18, provides for testimony
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selves indicate that an abandonment of the oath institution is in the offing,
future practice may show a gradual disuse, as judges avail themselves of
their "discretion" to forego swearing a witness, and acquire skill in securing
reliable testimony without resort to the oath.
Traditional Procedures and Modern Innovations.
In France, the requirement of a testimonial oath or affirmation is rigidly
enforced, in accordance with the principle that the oath "makes a person a
witness," for only after swearing is one subject to the sanctions imposed upon
false testimony.69 In Italy, with a few exceptions, "witnesses 'before the judge-
investigator do not swear," but are reminded by him of the penalties for false
testimony. 0 Yet, upon trial, "all witnesses, even informers, complainants or
civil parties," must, under sanction of nullity, take an oath,7' although, as
under the French code, the nullity may be cured by failure to raise it on
appeal."2 The requirement of the oath at the trial, as contrasted with its ex-
press rejection during the investigation stage, must 'be evaluated in context
with the imposition of a uniform penalty upon "false testimony"-sworn or
unswoM. 73 Since the oath does not serve as a legal deterrent to lying, the
of witnesses to be supported by oath, or other solemn affirmation (§ 187), if demanded
by any of the parties, or if the court finds it necessary. The writer owes this information
to Mr. Adam Vestberg, Secretary to the Danish Ministry of Justice, Graduate Fellow
at the Yale Law School 1958-1959.
69. FR. CODE PLNAL arts. 361-66; see 2 VIDAL, CoUas DE DROIT CIMINEL Er DE
SCIENCE PANITENTI&RE No. 730, at 1058 (9th ed. Magnol 1949) [hereinafter cited as
VMAL-MAGNOL].
Even before the judge-investigator, witnesses must take an oath, Fa. CODE PROC.
PtNALE art. 103, although that oath is not "sacramental" and does not subject the per-
jurious witness to penalties for "false testimony," 2 ENCYCLOPLDIE DALLOZ, RPERToIRn
DE DROIT CRIMINEL ET DE PROCEDURE PANAL.E Tinwin No. 89, at 891, 896 (1954). In France
the crime of "false testimony" corresponds to "perjury" in other legal systems; there is
no crime of unsworn false testimony. Significantly, the new FR. CoDE PROC. PNZNALE arts.
103, 109 has preserved the oath requirement at the investigation stage. The oath require-
ment also obtains in civil cases. FR. CODE PROC. civ. art. 263, para. 2, as amended, Decret
No. 58-1289, Dec. 22, 1958, [1958] Journal Officiel 11608, which reads in pertinent part:
"Every witness, before being heard ... shall take an oath to tell the truth." The phrase,
"all this under sanction of nullity," of the former version has been omitted. See also
FR. 'CODE PROC. civ. art. 278. The parties cannot, by common consent, relieve a witness
from the oath requirement, but the defect of omitting the oath is cured by failure to
object. 2 ENCYcLOPZDIE DALLoz, R PERTOIRE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE
Timoin No. 21, at 950, 952 (1956).
70. CoDicE Di PROcEDURA PENALE art. 357 (Italy Franchi & Feroci ed. 1949) [here-
inafter cited as ITAL. CODICE PROC. PENALE].
71. ITAL. CoDICE PROC. PENAE arts. 448, para. 4; 449, para. 1.
72. See 2 ANDRiOLI, CommENTO AL CoDICE DI PROCEDURA. civLE 207, comment 2 (3d
rev. ed. 1957). The nullity sanction imposed upon omission of the oath is inferred from
the provision which equates refusal to swear with refusal to testify.
73. ComCa PENALE art. 372. (Italy Franchi & Feroci ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited
as ITAL. CODIcE PENAL ]; see VANNINI, MANUALE DI DIRITTO PENALE ITALIANO-PARTE
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appeal of the oath is clearly moral and religious. Thus, it is used exclusively
at trial, so that its import is not sullied by too frequent employment.
The most extreme contrast to the French and, to a lesser extent, the
Italian pattern is presented by the Swiss Federal Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure,74 which grants the court, in all cases, discretionary authority to require
an oath (or a "hand-vow") after all testimony has been taken.7 5 The court
may impose the oath or vow on its own motion or on the motion of a party.
Prior to the taking of testimony, the judge is required to remind the witness
that he may be later asked to take an oath.76 The Swiss Federal Penal Code
imposes a penalty upon false testimony, sworn and unsworn,77 but the fact
that false testimony was supported by oath constitutes an aggravating factor.78
Austrian and German law occupy a middle ground between the French
and Swiss positions. In Austrian criminal procedure, witnesses may be sworn
during the investigation stage in exceptional cases only.7 9 At the trial, wit-
nesses called by the parties are in principle required to be sworn, under
sanction of nullity, in advance of their testimony on the merits. The oath
may be omitted 8 0 with the express consent of both the prosecutor and the
accused, 8' however, if the court considers it unnecessary. A witness called
by the presiding judge may be sworn, at the discretion of the court, after
the testimony is taken.8 2 The parties must be given an opportunity to be
SPEcxALE 101 (rev. & enlarged ed. 1951). In contrast to the old code, which in art. 214
provided for mitigation in case the testimony was unsworn, the present code in art. 372
does not mention the oath, although it deals with various aggrevating factors. See 2 IL
CoDIcE PENALE ILLUSTRATO ARTicoLo PER ARIC0OLO No. 564 (Ugo Conti ed. 1934) (comment
to art. 372 of the Code).
74. Bundesgesetz iiber die Bundesstrafrechtspflege vor 15. Juni 1934 (Swit. Federal
Law of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter cited as Swrr. B. Sm. P.]), in BuNDEsRECHTS-
Pr.,mu 75 (Bundeskanzlei 1953).
75. Swn'. B. ST. P. art. 86.
76. Swir. B. ST. P. art. 82.
77. ScawmEnZmscHEs Si n mESrzaucH (Swit. Federal Penal Code [hereinafter
cited as SwiT. ST. G.B.]) art. 307 (1937).
78. The Swiss practice has been described as "most subtle and . . . most logical."
GoRPHEA, L PPRtCLATION DES PRUVEs EN jusTicE 375 n.2 (1947).
79. Aus. ST. P.O. § 169, which provides:
In investigation proceedings, witnesses must not be sworn unless there is appre-
hension that, because of illness, protracted absence, lack of a definite place of abode,
or for other reasons, the witness will be unable to be present at the trial; or
unless the prosecutor, or the person charged, moves on important grounds that
the witness be sworn; or unless the judge-investigator believes that only by re-
quiring a confirmation of the testimony by oath will he be able to learn the full
truth.
80. It may also be postponed until after the testimony is taken.
81. Aus. ST. P.O. § 247. A mere failure to object is not sufficient. See Loiasm-
Smum 297 (collecting authorities).
82. Aus. ST. P.O. § 254. Para. 1 permits the presiding judge to call a witness or
expert, although there has been no motion to that effect by either the prosecutor or the
accused, if the judge expects from such witness or expert information concerning sub-
stantial facts.
19591 1539
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
heard on the question of whether a witness should be sworn, but the refusal
of a party to make a statement on the point does not prevent decision, nor
does failure to require an oath from such a witness constitute a ground for
nullifying his testimony.83 Whether testimony is sworn or unsworn is not
of great importance in fixing punishment for the crime of false testimony.
4
In civil cases, an Austrian court is permitted, but not required, to dispense
with the oath if both parties waive the swearing of a given witness.8 5 As a
rule, the oath is administered prior to the testimony, but the court may re-
serve decision regarding imposition of the oath until after the testimony
has been taken,86 omitting the oath if, in view of "the irrelevance of the
testimony or because of the slight measure of credibility attributable to it,"
swearing appears inappropriate.87 The decision to dispense with the oath is
not reviewable.88 The penalties for perjury and false testimony are identical
in civil and criminal cases, and these penalties only apply if the witness is
testifying before a "court."8 9
In Germany, the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the
oath must be taken after the testimony. 0 Administration of the oath prior to
the testimony is interpreted by some commentators as equivalent to a failure
to administer the oath, which would lead to reversal- of a judgment based on
such testimony.91 For a short time the court was authorized by law to
decide, in its reasonable discretion whether to require an oath,92 but legislation
in 1950 made the oath obligatory in most cases. However, the legislation
did provide for certain exceptions.93 Particularly noteworthy is the provision
that in minor criminal cases, those which can be initiated only by private
complaint, witnesses are generally not sworn. They are sworn only if the
court considers this "necessary because of the decisive significance of the
83. LoHSING-SEa IN 298.
84. See STR GEsErz (Aus. Penal Code [hereinafter cited as Aus. ST. G.]) §§ 199a,
202, 204, derived from Penal Code of 1852, now Asrulcar SAMIALUNG No. 2 (1945);
LOHsiNGSEamI 297. But see 2 RITTLER, LEHRBTJCI DES 6STERREICHISCHEN STRAFRECUTS
299 (1938) (maintaining that in cases of perjury the punishment is always aggravated).
85. Aus. Z.P.O. § 336, para. 1.
86. Aus. Z.P.O. § 337. However, for the clarification of his personal circumstances,
a witness may be questioned prior to being sworn regarding admissibility of his oath
or of his being heard as a witness, as well as regarding the question of whether his
statement can serve to determine the facts in issue.
87. Aus. Z.P.O. § 338, para. 2.
88. Aus. Z.P.O. § 349, para. 2.
89. Arbitral tribunals are not "courts" within the meaning of Aus. ST. G. § 199a.
Nor is a notary public a "court" for purposes of this section. 2 RiTaa, op. cit. supra
note 84, at 290.
90. GEL. ST. P.O. § 59.
91. ScHMIDr, op. cit. supra note 58, pt. 2, § 59, comments 3-4, at 137-39. For the
contrary view of Schwartz, as noted by Schmidt, see ibid.
92. From 1943, Regulation of May 29, 1943, [1943] 1 R.G. Bl. 341 (Ger.), to 1950,
Law of Sept. 12, 1950, [1950] B.G. Bl. 629 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
93. See, e.g., GEm ST. P.O. §§ 60, 63; Sciamirr, op. cit. supra note 58, pt. 2, at 134.
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testimony or in order to bring about truthful testimony." The oath may be
administered during the preliminary investigation only after a determination
that the particular witness' "sworn testimony" will be lost by the time of trial,
or that only the oath will bring about a truthful statement on an important
issue.04 Administration of the oath during trial is left to the discretion of the
court if the witness at the time of the hearing is over sixteen but under eight-
een years of age, or if the witness is the victim of the crime, or a person so
related to the accused as to be entitled to refuse to testify.9 5 Finally, when
"the court attributes no substantial significance to the testimony and, in its
opinion, even under oath no substantial testimony is to be expected," the oath
may be omitted. 0
The impact of modern German legislation on oath administration is re-
flected in the interpretation of this last provision. The meaning of the phrase
"substantial significance" (wesentliche Bedeutung)97 is highly controversial.98
The Bundesgerichtshof has held that the term "is closely related to rele-
vance,"9 9 and is not related to credibility at all, so that even obviously in-
credible testimony must be sworn to, if it has a sufficient bearing on the
outcome. 10 0 "Substantial statements, as regards their meaning as bases of
judgment," have been held to "occupy the middle ground between irrelevant
testimony and testimony of decisive significance." 10 ' Whatever the theoretical
definition, it seems clear that "any court which leaves testimony unsworn
must find it difficult to rely on such testimony in the grounds of decision."' 10 2
Since intellectual immaturity resulting in a lack of understanding of the
oath's significance constitutes an absolute oath impediment,10 3 discretion to
forego imposing the oath upon youthful witnesses between the ages of sixteen
and eighteen is thought to require the judge to consider "the total mental
and moral personality" of the young witness. 10 4 Mere incredibility of testi-
94. See id. pt. 2, § 65, comment at 154.
95. GER. ST. P.O. § 61. The last mentioned persons are enumerated in § 52, given in
full in note 183 infra.
96. GER. ST. P.O. § 61, No. 3.
97. Ibid.
98. For a summary of the controversy among commentators, see ScHMnr, op. cit.
supra note 58, pt. 2, at 148-51.
99. Judgment of Oct. 4, 1951, Bundesgerichtshof (III. Strafsenat), 5 N.J.W. 74, 75
(Ger. Fed. Rep.).
100. Some commentators, of course, assert that testimony that is not credible cannot
be relevant. For citations see ScaniDr, op. cit. supra note 58, pt. 2, at 148.
101. Judgment of Jan. 23, 1951, Bundesgerichtshof ('Strafsenat), 1 B.G.H. St. 8, 11
(Ger. Fed. Rep.).
102. Statement of rapporteur of the legislation to the German Parliament, cited in
ScHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 58, pt. 2, at 149. Even in minor cases, in which testimony,
in principle, is to remain unsworn, the grounds of mwt administering the oath, rather than
those of administering it, must be stated in the trial record. Decision of Feb. 7, 1957,
Bundesgerichtshof (IV. Strafsenat), 10 N.J.W. 550 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
103. GER. ST. P.O. § 60, No. 1; see text at notes 152-53 infra.
104. Judgment of Nov. 15, 1935, Reichsgericht (I. Strafsenat), 70 R.G. St. 20, 23
(Ger.).
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mony is not in itself decisive, since it may be based on error; but when
incredibility appears to result from a moral defect, the oath should gen-
erally 'be omitted. Friendship between the witness and the accused has been
particularly mentioned as a ground for foregoing the oath.10
The German Code of Civil Procedure provides that a witness to whom no
oath impediment10 applies "is to be sworn, if the court considers this de-
sirable (geboten) in view of the significance of the testimony or in order
to bring about a truthful testimony and the parties do not renounce adminis-
tration of the oath."'10 7 This provision has been hailed as a mark of signifi-
cant progress, eliminating "one of the last formal rules of proof."' 08 Upon
close analysis the innovation appears less sweeping than might have been
expected. For, although a witness is not generally to be sworn,1°' courts have
been cautioned that they must not "as so often happens in practice, . . .
believe blindly every witness upon his mere say so." 110 Some importance is
also attached to the fact that the Code of Civil Procedure first states that
the witness "is to be sworn,""' in contrast to the provision of the Labor
Courts Act 112 which furnished the pattern for the Code's rules on the oath.
Accordingly, it would seem that courts must use restraint in omitting the
oath.
It is permissible to require the witness to swear only to parts of his testimony,
and it is said to be desirable to limit the oath to essential points.113 The oath
must not be administered prior to the testimony,114 the requirement of a
Nacheid being similar to that in criminal cases. 115 The appellate court may
require an oath from a witness who was not sworn below." Review extends
of course to any abuse of discretion."17
Perhaps the most important provision of the German Code of Civil
Procedure in this context is that allowing waiver of a testimonial oath by
105. See ScHmIDr, op. cit. supra note 58, pt. 2, § 61, comment 4, at 147 (collecting
authorities).
106. The law concerning oath impediments is found in Ga. Z.P.O. § 393.
107. GER. Z.P.O. § 391.
108. 1 STEIN & JONAS, KommENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 391, comment I,
1 (18th rev. ed. Sch6nke 1953) [hereinafter cited STEIN-JONAS].
109. BAUMBACH-LAUTERBACHE § 391, comment 1, at 709.
110. Ibid. One commentator feels that consideration should be given to the question
of whether "in fairness to the party to whom the testimony is adverse, he may be ex-
pected to submit to such testimony without oath. See 1 STEIN-JoNAs § 391, comment I, 2.
111. Ibid.
112. In labor court cases, ARBnITsGamcrTsGESaEiZ §§ 58, 64 (Ger. Depene & Hans
ed. 1932), an oath is administered to witnesses only if the tribunal considers it necessary
to induce a truthful statement.
113. 1 STEIN-JONAS § 391, comment I, 5.
114. Gxm. Z.P.O. § 392.
115. See 1 STEm-JoNAs § 391, comment 1.
.116. A witness may be heard at the appellate level.
117. See 1 STEIN-JONAS § 391, comment I, 3 (d).
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party agreement. In Germany, in contrast to Austria, the court cannot require
the oath if both parties waive its imposition."'
Oath Impediments
All civil-law countries forbid administration of the oath to certain classes
of persons. In some, these oath prohibitions parallel testimonial disabilities,
while in others incapacity to testify under oath is distinct from capacity as a
witness.
There are two classes of oath disabilities: those based on lack of sufficient
perception and understanding, and those reflecting moral distrust." 9 The
first exemption is reflected in the rule, prevailing in all civil-law countries,
which bars placing children on oath.' 20 The moral distrust rationale has been
used to disqualify relatives of an accused or a party, for such persons are
presumed to be biased, and thus inclined towards perjury. 12 ' To these two
groups may be added what, at first blush, appears to be but a subdivision
of the moral distrust classification: it is the disability which attaches to those
convicted of certain criminal offenses. In most countries, however, this disa-
bility, conceived of as a "collateral punishment," and not as a social defense
measure, -22 is incurred although the crime in issue does not necessarily evince
the accused's proneness to lying.12 3 In order to understand this irrational oath
impediment fully, it is necessary to digress briefly into its history.
After substituting, in most cases, deprivations of freedom for the death
penalties of medieval law, post-Revolutionary legislators felt that a sudden
transition from a death sentence to life imprisonment was too abrupt. To
remedy this inadequacy, the French introduced the penalty of "civic death,"
conceived of as a halfway house between life imprisonment and natural
death.
124
118. Gm. Z.P.O. § 391.
119. See 2 ElCYCL.OPlmE DALLoz, REPERTOIRE DE DROIT CRIIXNEL ET DE PROCEDURE
PLNALE Thnoin, at 891, 892 n,17 (1954).
120. See, e.g., text at notes 132, 171 infra.
121. In Decision of Jan. 9, 1957, Bundesgerichtshof (IV. Strafsenat), 10 N.J.W.
431 (Ger. Fed. Rep.), the Fourth Criminal Senate stated that putting a witness on oath
is intended to induce him to tell the truth. For this reason the legislature held it
desirable to prohibit the taking of an oath when this does not increase the credibility
of the testimony of a suspected witness and cannot remove his bias.
122. For Swiss law, see note 172 infra. In France, the disability is listed among
"penalties" in the Penal Code and in legal literature. See, e.g., Vounzr, DROIT PENAL ET
cRnIMINoGiE 584-87 (1956).
123. See Debates on the Swiss Penal Code cited nfra note 173.
124. See Pfenninger, Die Strafem an der Rechtsfiihigkeit, 61 ZETSCERIFT FUR
SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT (Neue Folge) 235, 236 (1920).
"Civic death" was a survival of the ancient Germanic "peacelessness!' (Friedlosigkeit)
or its medieval modification, "outlawry" (Echtlosigkeit, exlex, Acht). Its avowed pat-
tern, however, was the Roman "capitis deminutio miaxima," though, unlike the latter,
civic death did not reduce the convict from a person to a thing.
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One sentenced to civic death retained his rights of personal integrity, but
his legal capacity was that of a dead person.' 25 Vigorous opposition to this
institution, on the ground of its fictive nature, its incompatibility with the
reformative function of punishment, its immorality, and the injustice which it
perpetrated on innocent relatives of the convict, 1
26 led to its abolition.12 7
The postconviction oath disability, however, remains as a vestige of this
concept of civic death.128 But in some countries there is a tendency to limit
the disability to conviction for crime which may rationally bear on truthful-
ness, and thus to treat it as a social defense measure rather than as punish-
ment.
The rules on oath impediments constitute the area of widest divergence
in the oath laws of various civil-law countries.
France. "[I]n order to be a witness, a person must be capable of sup-
porting his declaration by his oath."' 29 Persons disqualified from taking an
oath may nonetheless be heard by virtue of the discretionary power of the
president of the court of assizes, but only "by way of simple information"
(t titre de simple renseignment).13° Authority to hear, without oath, certain
witnesses who are barred from swearing has been recently accorded to
courts of lower rank.
131
In France, the grounds for not admitting a person to oath reflect the lack
125. Id. at 237.
126. These objections were raised particularly by Feuerbach. See id. at 137.
127. France abolished it by law of May 31, 1854. In Prussia it was abolished by
the Constitution of 1850. See id. at 238.
The phenomenon of forfeiture of oath capacity as part of civic death has been traced
to the status of being a witness in early Rome, where the giving of testimony was con-
sidered a privilege accorded only to a citizen. This privilege was accordingly lost by
infamia. See ROHR, DIE EINSTELLUNG IN DER BURGERLICHEN EHRENFXHIGKEIT iA
SCHWEIZERISCHEN STRAFRECHT 17 (1940). The forfeiture of oath capacity attaching
to conviction for larceny is traceable to medieval German law, in which dishonorable
actions (ehrlose Handhngen.), particularly robbery and larceny, and generally, any act
evincing a "base attitude" (gemeine Gesinnung), rendered the culprit "dishonored"
(ehrlos), which disqualified him from taking the oath of purgation, so that an ordeal was
the only remedy left to him. See Pfenniger, supra note 124, at 243. In the Canton of
Graubfinden the expression of a man being "put out of honor and weapon" still exists,
PENAL CODE § 14 (1851), meaning that he is deprived of the right to carry arms and to
testify under oath-an expression reflecting the historical conception of the weapon and
the oath as symbols of civic honor. ROHR, op. cit. supra at 30.
,128. In France, this is particularly indicated by the name of the institution, "civil
degradation," and by the nature of the disabilities it entails. See FP. CODE PfENALE art.
34, No. 4o.
129. 2 ENCYCLOPtDIE DALLOZ, REPERTOIRE DE DROlr CRIMINEL ET DE PROCELDURE
PLNALE Tgmnoin No. 12, at 892 (1954).
130. See FR. CODE PROC. PENALE arts. 330, para. 3; 336, para. 2. Formerly this dis-
cretion was not expressly granted by the Code, but was generally accepted as conferred
upon the president. See 2 VIDAL-MAGNOL 1053.




of perception or moral distrust theories. Youth constitutes an oath impedi-
ment, and the minimum age for taking oaths has been raised by the new
Code of Criminal Procedure from fifteen to sixteen years.1 32 "Reprochables"
are persons who are suspected of partiality and, therefore, barred from testify-
ing under oath if their testimony is objected to by the prosecution, the accused,
or a civil party. Even in the absence of objection, however, the court may
refuse to hear, under oath, witnesses within this category. 33 For example,
close relatives of the accused are reprochables.'34 Most meritorious is the ex-
clusion in French law of certain types of informers. The paid informer
(celid dont la dinonciation est ricornpens6e picuniairement par la loi) may
not be heard under oath if a party or the prosecution objects. 35 And in the
instance of the paid informer, in contrast to other oath impediments, the law
does not mention the alternative of hearing him without oath. A "person
who, acting by virtue of a legal obligation, or on his own initiative, brought
the facts charged to the attention of authorities" may be a witness, but the
president is required to call the attention of the court to the fact that the
witness is an informer. 36 Equally noteworthy is the prohibition against ad-
ministering an oath to a witness whose name has not been, or has been ir-
regularly, communicated to the parties. If the court finds a party's objection
well founded, it may hear the witness by way of "simple information" through
the president's discretionary power. 3 7
The institution of "civil degradation" has recently been reaffirmed in French
law. Such degradation, now attaching to punishment for a major crime,1 8
imports various incapacities, 3 9 among which is inability "to testify in court
132. FR. CODE PROC. P NALE arts. 108, 335, No. 70, 447. Compare FR. CODE INsT.
cRim. art. 79.
133. Bulletin Criminal, No. 3, Jan. 7, 1915, cited in 2 ENCYCLOP-DIE DALLOZ, op. cit.
supra note 129, at 893. FR. CODE PROC. I 4 NALE art. 336, para. 1, however, provides that
examination of such witnesses under oath does not render the testimony void.
134. FR. CODE PROC. PENALE art. 335 (procedure before the Cour d'assises) provides:
The testimony of the following persons must not be received under oath:
1. The father, the mother or of any other ascendant of the accused or of any
of the accused persons who are present and subject to the same trial;
2. The son, daughter or any other decendant;
3. The brothers and sisters;
4. In-laws of the same degree;
5. The husband or wife; this prohibition applies even after divorce;
FR. CODE PROC PtNALE art. 448 (procedure before a tribunal correctionnel) provides
that testimony from these persons "shall be received" without oath. This provision is
incorporated by reference in art. 536 (procedure before a tribunal de police).
135. FR. CODE PROC. PANALE arts. 337, para. 2; 451, para. 2.
136. FR. CODE PRoc. PLNALE arts. 337, para. 1; 451; para. 1.
137. FR. CODE PROC. PENALE arts. 329, 330.
138. FR. CODE PANAL art. 28, as amended, Law of November 20, 1957.
139. For example, loss of political rights, inability to be a member of a family
council.
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otherwise than by giving simple information.' 40 In cases of conviction for
certain minor crimes, including false testimony in a matter involving a minor
crime, the court has discretion to impose a similar prohibition on testimony
under oath. 141
The Cour de ,Cassation has repeatedly interpreted oath incapacities as being
limited to those provided for by law, on the ground that they are exceptions
to the general principle of testimony under oath.142 In line with this principle,
the Cour de Cassation has reversed a death sentence because the nephew of
the accused was heard without being sworn ;143 reversed a sentence based on
the unsworn testimony of two former sons-in-law whose successive marriages
to the accused's daughter had been dissolved by divorce ;144 set aside a larceny
conviction dependent upon the unsworn testimony of the accused's mistress ;145
and reversed a conviction founded upon the testimony of a witness who had
not been sworn because, contrary to law, she had been present at the trial prior
to her testimony. 46
In French civil cases, witnesses play a subordinate role, since, in suits
involving transactions exceeding a certain value, proof by testimony is gener-
ally excluded, the parties being required to secure documentary evidence.
47
Oath impediments are similar to those contained in the criminal law.
148
Germany. Oath prohibitions are strictly enforced in Germany. If an oath
is erroneously administered to a person who is subject to an oath impediment,
the testimony is admissible only as "unsworn" in the court's discretion.
149
140. 'Fa. CODE PENAI. art. 34, No. 3.
141. F. CODE P--NAL art. 42, No. 8; art. 362, para. 4.
142. E.g., Case of Buttely, Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), Feb. 28, 1946, [1946]
D. 186 (Fr.).
143. Tripier v. Min. public, Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), March 14, 1935, [1935]
Dalloz Hebdomadare 255 (Fr.).
144. 'Case of Ahmed Said Arab ben Rababh, Cour de Cassation (CI. crim.). Feb. 4,
1954, [1954] D. 365 (Fr.).
145. Case of Fauvet, Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), Feb. 25, 1958, [1958] D. 516
(Fr.).
146. 'Case of Buttely, Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), Feb. 28, 1946, [1946] D. 186
(Fr.). The court held that violation of FP- CODE INSTR. CaIma. art. 316 (now FP. CODE
PROC. P-NALE art. 325), which forbids witnesses to be in the courtroom when they are
not testifying, did not nullify her testimony. Nevertheless, it was that violation which
caused the lower court to refuse to admit her to oath, and FP. CODE iN sT. cRmx. art. 317
(now FR. CODE PROC. PENALE art. 331, para. 4), providing that witnesses shall be sworn,
carries the sanction of nullity.
147. FR. CODE CIVIL art. 1341. See also ITAI. CODICE clVlna art. 2721.
148. Except as regards questions of status and matters of separation and divorce,
the testimony of relatives and in-laws of a party in direct line, or of his spouse, even
divorced, is not admissible. FR. CODE PROC. civ. art. 262, paras. 1, 2, as amended, Decree
No. 58-1289, Dec. 22, 1958, [1958] Journal Officiel 11608. Persons under the age of
fifteen may be heard without oath. Fa. CoDE PROC. crv. art. 262, para. 3. Those
under disability due to conviction for crime are not admitted to oath and must not be
heard except by way of information. Fp. CODE 'aRoc. civ. art. 262, para. 4.
149. The court must advise the parties that it will treat the testimony as unsworn.
The purpose of this requirement is to give the accused an opportunity to make further
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And unless the grounds of decision show that the court expressly treated the
testimony as unsworn, the judgment may be reversed on the theory that the
lower court may have erroneously given the testimony the weight of a sworn
statement.1 0
Two groups of oath prohibitions are common to criminal and civil pro-
cedure: those based on mental incapacity and those based on conviction. A
third group relating to the crime at bar, of course, is limited to criminal
cases.
151
The German oath impediment based on mental incapacity differs from a
corresponding impediment in Swiss law,1 2 which is predicated upon defects
of perception or judgment generally. The German law defines the impediment
as a flaw affecting the witness' understanding of the nature and significance
of the oath.15 3 Emphasis is thus placed on the solemnity of the oath itself.
General incapacity based on conviction for crime attaches in German law
only to the testimonial crimes, i.e., false testimony and perjury.1 4 While this
apparently strict limitation would seem commendable, note the many species
of crimes within these genera, for example, perjury by omission, attempted
perjury, and unsuccessful instigation of perjury.155 The German law of
suggestions as to proof. Judgment of May 23, 1938, Reichsgericht (I. Strafsenat), 72
R.G. St. 219, 220 (Ger).
150. Judgment of May 13, 1921, Reichsgericht (IV. Strafsenat), 56 R.G. St. 94 (Ger.).
151. Gum ST. P.O. § 60 reads as follows:
The oath must not be administered
1. To persons who, at the time of questioning, have not attained the age of six-
teen years or who, due to a lack of mental maturity or to mental disability, have no
sufficient conception of the nature and significance of the oath;
2. To persons who, according to provisions of criminal statutes, have no capacity
of being heard as witnesses under oath;
3. To persons who are suspected of, or were convicted for, commission of the
act which is the subject of the investigation, or participation therein, harboring [acces-
sorship after the fact] or receiving.
GER Z.P.O. § 393, except for a slight linguistic modification of the first sentence, is identical;
No. 3, of course, is omitted.
152. See note 169 infra.
153. See note 151 supra.
154. The "provisions of criminal statutes" to which Gmn. ST. P.O. § 60, No. 2, and
GEL Z.P.O. § 393, No. 2, refer are those comprised in GMn. ST. G.B. § 161, which reads thus:
(1) In the case of every conviction for perjury, except in cases under §§ 157 and
158 [perjury in a state of necessity and active repentence], the sentence must declare
forfeiture of civic rights of honor and besides permanent incapacity of the convicted
person to be heard under oath as a witness or expert.
(2) In cases under §§ 153, 156 to 159 [unsworn false testimony, affirmation in
lieu of an oath, perjury in a state of necessity, perjury with active repentence, unsuc-
cessful instigation of unsworn false testimony or affirmation in lieu of an oath] the
sentence may declare, besides the punishment of imprisonment, forfeiture of civic
rights of honor.
155. See text at notes 245-59 infra.
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perjury indicates that the oath itself is protected.0 0 Thus, a conviction for
perjury, except where a reduction of punishment is granted on the ground of
"necessity"' 157 or "active repentence,"'' 5 carries a mandatory forfeiture of
capacity to testify under oath, whereas, in cases of conviction for false testi-
niony, forfeiture is discretionary.159 Nevertheless, the forfeiture of oath ca-
pacity in German law has been held to be a social defense measure rather
than a penalty. Consistently with this conception, the forfeiture is perman-
ent.'6
0
Austria. Austria has long been a leader in progressive oath policy. In 1787
Austrian law made unsworn false testimony a punishable offense.',, This has
given an entirely new imprint to Austrian oath legislation. When a witness
subject to an impediment is heard under oath, only the oath is null and void;
the testimony remains effective as an unsworn statement. 
6
2
Oath impediments are of two kinds: absolute ones, those which operate
against any accused or party, and relative ones, those which operate only with
regard to certain persons or in specified situations. Absolute oath impediments
are either temporary or permanent. Conviction for crime affixes a permanent
absolute oath impediment in criminal as well as in civil cases only when the
crime in issue bears on credibility. 163 The impediment ceases to operate only
when the conviction is struck from the criminal record, which is not necessarily
contemporaneous with the end of the conviction's other consequences.
1'0 t
Conviction or investigation for other major crimes generally constitutes a
temporary absolute impediment, lasting until termination of the punishment
or the close of the proceedings. 1 5
156. See 2 KOHLRAUSCH, STRAFGESETZBUCH § 152, comment III, 2-3, at 330, 331
(41st ed. Lange 1956).
157. Gm ST. G.B. § 157.
158. Gam ST. G.B. § 158.
159. GEL, ST. G.B. § 161.
Forfeiture of oath capacity is mandatory even in convictions for the unsuccessful
instigation of perjury. Decision of Aug. 29, 1956, Bundesgerichtshof (III. Strafsenat),
9 N.J.W. 168 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
Forfeiture does not deprive the offender of capacity to testify as a civil party under
oath or to take an oath of insolvency. ScH6NKE, SiaAFGEs=rZBucn: KOMMENTAR § 161,
comment 11(2), at 626 (8th rev. ed. Schr5der 1957).
160. Judgment of March 10, 1953, Bundesgerichtshof (I. Strafsenat), 4 B.G.H. St.
158 (Ger. Fed. Rep.) ; Judgment of Oct. 19, 1959, Bundesgerichtshof (II. Strafsenat),
6 B.G.H. St. 373, 375 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). See also 2 KOHLRAUSCH, op. cit. supra note
156, § 163, comment IV, at 351.
161. See 2 RiTTLER, LEHRBUCH DES 6STERREIcHISCHEN STRAFREcHTS 289 (1938).
162. See LOHSING-SERINI 290.
163. The statutes refer specifically to false testimony and false oaths. Aus. ST. P.O.
§ 170, No. 3; Aus. Z.P.O. § 336, No. 1; see LoHSI G-SEUNI 290.
164. Lol NsG-SEMNi 291.
165. Aus. ST. P.O. § 170, No. 2. "Investigation" comprises both the proceedings
initiated by the raising of the charge, and meant to establish whether trial proceedings
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Persons with a relative oath impediment, in addition to "suspects,"'16 6 are
those who bear enmity toward the accused, provided, however, that this senti-
ment is not merely evidence of a hostile feeling, but rather conviction of some
duration. 167 The court must inquire into whether, considering the circum-
stances and the personality of the witness, the enmity is of a nature as would
affect his credibility. A final relatively disqualified class includes persons
who, when questioned, made false material statements, unless they can prove,
to the satisfaction of the court, that their untruthfulness was the result of
honest error. And silence may constitute a falsehood.168
Switierland. The Swiss Federal Criminal Procedure Act places broad pro-
hibitions on the use of the oath and vow. 0 9 It disqualifiies all persons who
have a right to refuse testimony. 7 0 In addition, minors under the age of
eighteen years cannot be sworn.' 7' This provision is commendable in that
it affords young witnesses protection against prosecution for perjury. In con-
trast, the Swiss oath impediment based on conviction is open to objection.
It extends to persons "who, by a criminal sentence, have been declared to
have forfeited their political rights." "Suspension of civic capacity" is a puni-
tive measure, 72 mandatory when conviction results in imprisonment in a
are to be opened, Aus. ST. P.O. § 91, and the trial proceedings up to final termination,
LoHSING-SERIN 291.
In contrast to its Italian counterpart, see ITAL. CODicE PRoc. PENALE art. 159, para. 2,
the Austrian impediment does not apply during stay in a compulsory labor institution
or during police supervision, see LoHsiNG-SERim 291.
Oath incapacity also results from defects of perception and memory, Aus. ST. P.O.
§ 170, No. 5, and youth (the minimum oath age is 14 years), Aus. ST. P.O. § 170, No. 4.
166. Aus. ST. P.O. § 170, No. 6.
167. Aus. ST. P.O. § 170, No. 6.
168. Aus. ST. P.O. § 170, No. 7; LoHsIxa-Smu 293.
169. SwiT. B. Sm. P. art. 86, para. 4:
Neither an oath nor a hand vow must be imposed upon
1. Persons who have a right to refuse testimony,
2. Persons of less than eighteen years,
3. Persons who lack judgment capacity and those with disabilities of memory
or perception.
4. Persons who, by virtue of a criminal sentence, have been declared to have
forfeited their political rights.
170. Swir. B. ST. P. art. 75:
The following persons are entitled to refuse testimony:
The relatives and relatives by marriage of the accused in direct line,
The brothers and sisters, the brother-in-law and the sister-in-law, the spouse
even if divorced, and the fiance of the accused,
His adoptive parents and adoptive children.
171. The minimum age for taking an oath in France is sixteen in criminal cases,
text at note 132 supra, and fifteen in civil cases, note 148 supra; in Austria, fourteeen
in criminal matters, note 165 supra; in Germany, sixteen in both civil and criminal cases,
note 151 supra.
172. This is evidenced by the marginal title-"Collateral Penalties" (Nebenstrafen)
-in the official version of the code. SwiT. ST. G.-B. art. 5. Additional support for this
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penitentiary, and discretionary in cases of lesser imprisonment if the act
evinces a "dishonorable attitude" (ehrlose Gesinnung). Suspension is never
permanent but always limited in time, which is a commendable aspect of
regarding it as a punishment rather than as a security measure.173 In addi-
tion, a mandatory suspension is prescribed in certain other cases, such as
pandering 1 4 or living on the earnings of a prostitute,175 and a discretionary
suspension is provided for in certain bankruptcy cases,1" 6 and generally in
cases of "crimes against the popular will.' 17 7 But a person deprived of civic
capacity may, upon his petition, be restored to such capacity by a judicial
act.
1 7 8
Privileges Against Oath Compulsion
Recognition of a right to refuse to swear or to affirm, as distinct from a
right to refuse to testify, is rare. No such right exists, for instance, in
Austria."'9 Legal systems, such as the French, which predicate the status
of being a witness upon oath taking,8 0 of course exclude an independent
right not to be sworn.' 8 '
view may be gathered from the provision's legislative history. See RoHR, op. cit. spra
note 127, at 85-88.
173. The maintenance of the institution of civic incapacity was strongly influenced
by Franz von Liszt, who believed that it was necessary to maintain the distinction between
imprisonment in a penitentiary and simple imprisonment, by imprinting a mark of dis-
honor upon the former. See von Liszt, Kriminalpolitische Aufgaben, 10 ZFITscHRIFT
FUR DIE GESAMTE STRAECHTSWISSEXSCHAFr 51, 62-63 (1890).
The theory behind this impediment was manifested in the long deliberations which
ultimately led to enactment of the Swiss Federal 'Criminal Code. Two opposing views
were represented: one view, which was ultimately successful, proceeded on the assump-
tion that a released penitentiary inmate should be barred from public activities for a
certain time on grounds of simple decency (Rapporteur Seiler) ; the other view (Logoz),
pointed to the fact that many a serious crime punishable by imprisonment in the peni-
tentiary does not evince a base attitude. Finally, Hiberlin asserted that the decisive
factor is not the baseness of the criminal's attitude but rather the fact that every major
crime evinces opposition to the state. See RonA, op. cit. supra note 127, at 86.
174. SwiT. ST. G.B. art. 199.
.175. Swrr. ST. G.B. art. 201.
176. Swrr. ST. G.B. art. 171.
177. SwiT. ST. G.B. art. 284 (election crimes).
178. SWiT. ST. G.B. art. 76 provides that "when the actor has been suspended in his
civic capacity and at least two years have passed since the judgment was executed, the
judge may, upon the actor's petition, restore him in his civic capacity, if this is justified
by his conduct"
179. See LoHsiNcGSmuNi 290 (persons who have a right to refuse testimony may
be required to take an oath if they choose to testify).
180. See text at note 129 supra.
181. The traditional duty of witnesses in French law is to "appear, take the oath
and testify." FL. CODE INSTm. cam. art. 80 required him, under the penalty of a fine, "to
appear and satisfy the citation," which covered the three obligations. The 1957 legislation
provided in FL. CoDE PRoc. PENAiE art. 109, para. 1, that the witness is bound to "appear,
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In Germany, however, there are instances in which persons generally en-
titled to refuse testimony may choose to testify in a criminal case and yet
refuse to swear or to affirm.' 8 2 Such privilege is granted to persons close to
the accused or the person charged, 83 but not to those entitled to refuse
testimony on other grounds (clergymen, attorneys, journalists, publishers, or
government officials).1s- The court is required to inform witnesses entitled
to refuse taking the oath of this right. Failure to do so constitutes reversible
error. 8 5 In German civil cases it is uncertain whether a witness who has a
right to refuse testimony may, after testifying, still refuse to take an oath. 80
The wording of the relevant provision'187 has been interpreted as assuming
the existence of such a right of refusal.'8 8 As to the meaning to be drawn
from refusal, it has been held that, while "it would be wrong to evaluate
refusal to take the oath so as to deny any evidentiary value to the testimony,
. . . under the circumstances of the concrete case, this inference may be
drawn."
80
take the oath and testify," but para. 2 of the same article provided that a fine was imposed
"if the witness does not appear." The legislative history shows the ommission of a fine
in cases of failure to swear or testify to have been intentional. One of the reasons ad-
vanced for this course of action was that commendable scruples may prevent a witness
from testifying, for example, against a friend, so that the witness shows sufficient good
faith by appearing. The Ordinance of December 23, 1958, added, however, a third sub-
division to art. 109, subjecting refusal to take the oath and to testify to a fine. See
Aberkane, Les Sanctions relatives au tinwignage, 14 REvuE DE ScIENcE CI I iNlE nT
DE DROIT PLNAL COMPAR9 (nouvelle srie) 1, 11-13 (1959).
182. "[T]he relatives of the accused named in § 52, subdiv. 1, have the right to refuse
supporting the testimony by oath... ." Gam ST. P.O. § 63.
183. GER. ST. P.O. § 52 provides:
(1) The following persons are entitled to refuse testimony:
1. the fiance of the person charged;
2. the spouse of the person charged, even where the marriage no longer exists;
3. one related to the person charged in direct line by blood, marriage, or
adoption; or collaterally by blood up to the third degree; or by marriage
up to the second degree, even where the marriage upon which the in-law
relationship is based no longer exists.
184. GEm. ST. P.O. § 53 deals with protection of confidential communications. But
attorneys and physicians have no right to refuse testimony after they are released of
their duty of secrecy. Gm ST. P.O. §§ 53, para. 2, 54 deal with special provisions
applicable to public officials.
185. SCHMIDr, LEHRKOmmENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND zuar GERicHTs-
VERFASSUNGSGESETZ pt. 2, § 63, comment III, at 153.
186. GE. Z.P.O. § 383 enumerates persons related to a party similar to the provisions
of Gm ST. P.O. § 52, para. 1, and adds various persons having a professional or official
duty of secrecy.
187. Gm Z.P.O. § 393.
188. See authorities cited in 1 STEIn-JO NAS § 393, comment III.
189. F. v. M., Oberster Gerichtshof (II. Zivilsenat), Nov. 4, 1948, 1 Entscheidungen
des Obersten Gerichtshofes ffir die Britishe Zone in Zivilsachen 226, 227 (Ger.), cited
in 1 STMN-JONAS § 392, comment III nA.
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THE OATH IN COMMON LAW COUNTRIES: COMPARATIVE
CONTEMPORARY LAW
The most astonishing feature of both English and American practice is
utilization of the oath in trifling matters and in a form which conveys no
sense of its importance and solemnity. A foreign observer may be particularly
struck by the daily American scene of swearing before a drug store attend-
ant, who, acting in the capacity of a notary public, administers the oath in
the interim period between selling soap and serving Coca-Cola. In contrast,
in most continental countries there is a trend toward limiting oath-taking and
avoiding its indiscriminate use.
In civil-law countries, efforts are made to avoid situations that are con-
ducive to perjury. These efforts are manifested by rules, for example, that
permit only one party to be sworn, or that prohibit persons with a strong
motivation to lie from swearing. In common-law countries, on the other hand,
oaths are constantly administered to persons whose interests are clearly ad-
verse, so that there is a certain degree of advance probability that one of them
will commit perjury.
Neither the discretionary nor the posttestimonial oath, both recent civil-law
innovations designed to avoid unnecessary oaths and perjury, is employed by
the common law. Of course, it might be rather difficult to fit the posttesti-
monial oath into the prevailing system of examination by question. The
German Nacheid is partly predicated upon the civil-law method of permitting
the witness to relate his story in narrative form.19 0
The common-law jurisdictions mouth the requirement that "the witness
must understand the nature and obligation of an oath before he will be allowed
to testify, and much effort has been expended in contesting whether or not
given witnesses were or were not able to understand the import of an oath."'' 1
Seldom, however, is the witness challenged as to his belief in the retribution
he presumably risks by taking a false religious oath. The burden is on the
190. GER. ST. P.O. § 69, para. 1; GER. Z.P.O. § 396, para. 1 provide that "the witness
shall state in narrative [literally, in comprehensive, connected] form what he knows of
the subject of the examination."
France specifically prohibits interrupting the narrative of the witness. FR. CODE PROC.
PENALE art. 331, para. 4. See also FR. CODE PROC. PENALE art. 332, para. 1, providing
that the president may put questions to the witness "after each testimony." Similarly,
FL_ CODE PROC. PLNALR art. 454, para. 1; FL, CODE PROC. civ. art. 265, as amended,
prohibit parties, under sanction of exclusion and fine, to "interrupt the witness in his
testimony." This method of interrogating the witness has the advantage of enabling
him to reconstruct the events spontaneously and without the inhibitory effects of the
"question." See Olinick, Questioning and Pain, Truth and Negation, 5 J. Am. Psycno-
ANALYT C Ass'N 302 (1957) ("paradoxically, the question not infrequently is utilized
to bar access to what might become known"). Questioning following the narrative
deposition then serves to elucidate doubtful points and to call the attention of the witness
to any statements that he might wish to rectify.
191. GUTrMACHER & WEI110N, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 360 (1952).
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witness to object to the religious form, something a nonbeliever is unlikely
to do for fear of placing the credit of his testimony in jeopardy.0 2 While
affirmation as a substitute for the oath is generally available, some statutes
permit its use only upon a showing of strong sentiment, religious or non-
religious, 1 3 against swearing.
Despite the present level of insight into child psychology, common-law
jurisdictions continue the anachronistic practice of having children of tender
years sworn. 1 4 And administering an oath to a criminal defendant is equally
paradoxical, since it often offers a choice between self-incrimination and
perjury. Moreover, the American practice of invoking the assistance of re-
ligion in those numerous and manifold transactions of everyday life in which
the oath is used contrasts strangely with hesitation on constitutional grounds
to render assistance to religion, by so much as transporting students to
parochial schools11u
LEGAL SYSTEMS WITHOUT AN OATH
Chinese Law 198
The argument that, in the absence of the oath, declarants are not sufficiently
appraised of the significance of statements made for official purposes is ade-
quately met in Chinese law. To call the witness' attention to the special
significance of "testimony," this law utilizes the same method which is used
in private law to emphasize the binding force of an act: the written form.
192. Sorensen, The Effectiveness of the Oath To Obtain a Witness' True Personal
Opinion, 47 J. Calm. L., C. & P.S. 284, 287 (1956).
193. See the English Oaths Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict. c. 46, § 5, in BoLANM & SAYRE,
OATHS AND AFFirmA'loNs 57-58 (1953). Under this act, "it is vital before a person
can be allowed to affirm that he objects on one of the grounds specified [that he has
no religious belief, or that the taking of an oath is contrary to his religious belief] to
being sworn." Id. at 25. In a recent English case it was held error to permit affirmation
by a Sikh who did not object to being sworn, but could not be sworn in accordance with
the rites of his religion because no copy of the Granth, the holy book of the Sikhs, was
available. Regina v. Pritam Singh, [1958] 1 All E.R. 199 (Leeds Assizes 1957), 74
L.Q. Rxv. 179 (1958). This case involved an interpretation of the Perjury Act, 1911,
1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 6, § 15(2), providing that "the expression 'oath' in the case of persons
for the time being allowed by law to affirm . . . includes affirmation." Apparently only
three copies of the Granth are known to exist in England. 74 L.Q. REv. 179 (1958).
See 67 C.J.S. Oaths & A i rmatidns § 6, at 9 n.11 (1950) (collecting American
authorities).
194. See Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L... 1329, 1373-75 (1959).
195. E.g., McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953); Judd v. Board
of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938) (overruled by a New York constitutional
amendment, N.Y. CoNsT. art. XI, § 4). But see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
196. The author owes the following information on Chinese law to Mr. Li Chun,
Associate Professor of Law, Soochow University, Taipai, Taiwan; graduate Fellow, Yale
Law School, 1958-1959.
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For example, a witness in a criminal trial is usually required, following long-
standing Chinese tradition, to sign a "bond to tell the truth," or a "recogniz-
ance."'197 Such bond or recognizance is executed in court by the witness
placing his signature, a cross, a chop (official stamp), or a fingerprint upon
the bond. 198 Before signing the bond, he is instructed regarding the obligations
it entails and the punishment imposed upon false testimony. 99 The bond
must state that the testimony to be given is based on actual facts, without
concealment, qualification, addition, or modification.20 0 While the bond is
usually executed prior to the testimony, it may be signed after examination.
20 1




Although secular and rationalistic in character, the bond performs the same
functions attributed to the civil-law oath. The law grants to certain witnesses
exemptions based on age, mental disability, or relationship to the accused..
2 0 3
The penalty for a false statement under bond is very heavy: penal servitude
for a period of not more than seven years.
20 4
197. CHINA COD: CGIM. Pnoc. art. 173, § I (1935).
198. CHINA CODE CRIM. PRoC. art. 176, § III (1935).
199. CHINA CODE CIIti. PRoc. art. 174, § I (1935).
200. CHINA CODE: CIM. PROc. art. 176, § I (1935).
201. CHINA CODE Cuim. Paoc. art. 175 (1935).
202. Not more than 50 Yuen ($50). CHINA CODE CRmu~. PROC. art. 180, § I (1935).
203. CHINA CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 173, § I (1935):
A witness shall be ordered to sign a bond to tell the truth, provided, however,
that if any one of the following circumstances is present, he shall not be so ordered:
(1) A person under the age of 16;
(2) A person who, because of mental disability, is incapable of understanding
the meaning and effect of a bond to tell the truth;
(3) A person who is connected with, or is suspected of being involved in, the
case as a co-offender, or who is suspected of concealing an offender, de-
stroying or falsifying evidence or of receiving stolen property;
(4) A person who comes within the circumstances specified in Section (I) of
Article 167 or Art. 169 and who does not refuse to testify.
The provisions referred to in No. 4 read as follows:
Article 167, Section (I). A witness may refuse to testify under any of
the following circumstances:
(1) Where the witness is or has been the spouse, blood relative within
the fifth degree, relative by marriage within the third degree, head of the family
or a member of the family of the accused or private complainant;
(2) Where the witness has entered into a contract of betrothal with the
accused or private complainant, or
(3) Where the witness is or has been the statutory agent of the accused
or private complainant or where the accused or private complainant is or has
been his (the witness') statutory agent.
Article 168. A witness may refuse to testify when his testimony may subject
him or others specified in Section (I) of the last article to criminal prosecution
or punishment.
204. CHINA PENAL CODE art. 168 (1935).
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Slavic Law: U.S.S.R. and Poland
Slavic tradition, rather than Communist ideology, has supported the abo-
lition of the oath in the Soviet Union and Poland. A political rationale is, of
course, put forth. Peculiarly enough, this rationale is based on neither atheism
nor secularism, but on the oath's incompatibility with an allegedly unique
Soviet doctrine of "intimate conviction.1
20 5
In Poland, the "promise to tell the truth" has replaced the oath.20 6 The
existence of the "promise" may be due, at least in part, to the fact that, while
less strong than in other countries, the oath tradition in Poland seems to
have been somewhat stronger than in Russia. The "promise," like the oath,
205. Thus, exclusion of the oath in the Soviet Republics was enunciated in the pro-
vision granting the judge freedom to evaluate the evidence. R.S.F.S.R. CODE CaMr.
PRoc. art. 57 (1923) (U.S.S.R.) declared: "The court is not limited to any formal means
of proof and it is in the court's discretion whether, under the circumstances of the case,
it wishes to admit evidence or demand its production by third persons, upon whom such
demand is binding. The oath is inadmissible in evidence." KODEKS R.S.F.S.R.-UGoLov-o-
PROTsESsuAL'NYI, Feb. 15, 1923, No. 7, ch. 106, art. 57, in UGOLOVNO PROTSESSUAL'NOE
ZAxNODATELSTVO S.S.S.R. i SoIuzNYKH REsPUBLIK (Karev ed. 1957) ; see VIsHINsKY,
TEolA, SUDEBNYKH DOKAZATELSTV v SOVETSKOm PRAVE 165-66 (Gosiurizdat 1950) ("Ac-
cording to Soviet law, any circumstance, regardless of its inherent contents or value,
may be evidence in the matter. Only the oath is not admissible as evidence, which is quite
natural, since 'evidence' of this kind is directly opposed to the principle of intimate
conviction, prevailing in Soviet Law.").
The recent Declaration of the Basic Principles of Criminal Procedure of the S.S.SR.
and Federated Republics does not incorporate the above provision. Zakon ob utverzhdenii
osnov ugolovnogo sudoproizvodstva Soiuza S.S.R. i Soiuznykh Respublik ch. 15, arts.
16-17, Dec. 25, 1958, 22 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta, Jan. 1, 1959, No. 1(933), at
66. It states that "any factual data" on the basis of which law officers establish "the
presence or absence of the socially dangerous act, the guilt of the person concerned...
and other circumstances which are relevant to the proper determination of the matter
... are evidence." Art. 16, subdiv. 1. It further enumerates types of such data, such as
testimony of witnesses, of the victim, documents. Art. 16, subdiv. 2. It finally provides
that all law officers are to evaluate the evidence "in accordance with their intimate con-
viction, based on a comprehensive, full and objective consideration of all circumstances
of the acts in their totality, being guided by law and socialist legal conscience," and that
"no evidence has . . . a [probative] force established in advance." Art. 17, subdivs. 1, 2.
While the oath is not mentioned, it may be assumed that since it was expressly declared
"inadmissible in evidence" in the previous law, failure to enumerate it in the present law
among the types of data that may serve as evidence, combined with the doctrinal position
taken by commentators, precludes its admission.
206. KODEKS POSTEOWANIA KARNEGO (,Code of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter cited
as Por.. K.P.x.]) art. 93 (Pol. 1950), [1950] Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
[hereinafter cited as Dz. U.] No. 40, ch. 364, at 496 (Pol.), provides that "during trial,
unless the parties release the witness from the promise and unless the court does not find
the promise to be necessary, the court shall take from the witness a promise in accordance
with a prescribed formula." It is the court, however, and not the parties which ultimate-
ly decides whether a promise is necessary. See KALIUNOWSK, PzEBsG PROCESTu xARNfO
212 (1957).
KODEKS POSTEpOWANA cywiLNEGO (Code of Civil Procedure [hereinafter cited as
PoL. K.P.c.]) art. 283 (Pot. 1950), [4950] Dz. U. No. 43, cl. 394, at 549 (Pol.), provides
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is apparently felt to be not fully consistent with free evaluation of the evidence,
for the Polish Code of Civil Procedure specifically provides that "the court
shall evaluate the testimony of the parties, even though made under a promise,
in accordance with its persuasion, on the basis of a complete consideration of
the collected material. 2 0 7 Certain persons are exempt from the requirement
to make a promise, in exact analogy to traditional civil-law oath disqualifi-
cations.2 °0 And care is taken that civil parties are not permitted to promise,
if their statements are inconsistent with each other.20 9
Both Russian and Polish abandonment of the oath as evidence is claimed
to be but a logical consequence of the doctrine of free evaluation of the evi-
dence. Since all civil-law countries regard this doctrine, widely known under
the French name of "intimate conviction" (intime conviction), as a legal
truism, one might assume that the ,Communist oath abolition, based on free
evaluation of the evidence, has no political character. Soviet writers, however,
emphatically reject any such assumption. According to them, "intimate con-
viction," as all legal institutions, is ultimately determined by the prevailing
economic structure.2 10 Hence, Communist "intimate conviction" is said to
have a different meaning than its capitalistic namesake.
In capitalistic countries-according to Communist writers-the process of
reaching an "intimate conviction" is regarded as a "spontaneous, vitalistic,"
or emotional process. This conception necessarily flows from the idealistic,
subjectivistic epistemology, allegedly dominant in capitalistic countries, accord-
ing to which the reality of the outside world-the "thing-in-itself"-is not
accessible to human knowledge. Capitalist legal scholars must, therefore,
that "witnesses may, with consent of the parties, be released by the court from making
a promise."
The Polish "promise" formula is: "Aware of the significance of my words and of
responsibility under the law, I solemnly promise that I will state the honest truth, not
concealing anything that is known to me." POL. K.P.K. art. 100. POL. K.r.c. art. 282
is the corresponding civil provision. In addition, civil parties who are heard only if
other evidence is insufficient or lacking are warned before being questioned that they
may be required to make a promise. Poi- K.P.c. art. 311.
207. Po.. K.P.c. art. 316. (Emphasis added.)
208. PoL. K.P.K. art. 99 provides that the following persons shall not make a
promise: "(a) a minor up to 14 years of age; (b) persons who, because of mental disease
or another disturbance of mental activity, do not realize the significance of the promise;
(c) persons suspected of participation in the act which is the subject of the proceedings
or of criminal activity closely connected with the accused." PoL. K.P.c. art. 283 prohibits
the taking of a. promise from minors under the age of 14 and from persons convicted
by final judgment for false testimony.
209. PoL. K.P.c. art. 314 provides that if questioning of the parties has not clarified
a given controversial fact, the court may interrogate under promise one of the parties
previously questioned without a promise regarding that fact, but this does not exclude
another party being similarly questioned under a promise as to another controversial fact.
The court may also confine the questioning under promise to part of the previous
testimony made without a promise. PoL. K.p.c. art. 315.
210. The following summary of Communist views is based on SciaA.r, PRoCas
KARNY POLSKI LUDOWEJ 363-72 (1953), who mainly follows VisiiNsKy, op. cit. supra note
205.
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assume that reality may be known only approximately, in terms of probability
or "moral certainty," not of actual certainty. Since absolute certainty cannot
be attained, some acceptable lesser criterion of reality must be assumed. That
standard, in capitalist countries, is the abstractly conceived "reasonable man."
Communist writers further maintain that the capitalist "moral certainty" is
merely a disguise for class justice administered by bourgeois courts and an
advance dispensation for judicial mistakes-mistakes "most opportune as in-
struments whereby, with the aid of the administration of justice, revenge can
be taken against people who are dangerous to a given regime." "' The reason-
able man' "-cries Vishinsky-"who on the basis of his intimate 'conviction'
or in conformance with his 'conscience' sends the unemployed to the guillotine
or to prison-is always the same 'reasonable bourgeois.' ,211 Intimate con-
viction, the Communists claim, is quite different in the Communist economic
and social structure.
Under the prevailing Communist philosophy, reality is objective, and acces-
sible to knowledge. "Intimate conviction" is admittedly politically deter-
mined.212 It is the conviction of a judge conditioned by the socialist society in
which he lives.2 13 The judge thus conditioned is not merely an umpire, but
is an active agent "directing the course of procedure in a manner that would
best serve the discovery of truth. '214 Thus, the judge may use all types of
evidence. For some reason the oath is the one exception.
But it is quite evident that this theory adds nothing to what has been said
in France and other civil law countries regarding the inconsistency of the oath
with the system of intimate conviction. The generally accepted meaning of
"intimate conviction" is that it excludes binding rules of proof. In this sense,
it refers to evaluation, and not to admissibility. To the extent that the oath
is deemed by law to add to the value of testimony, it is, of course, incompatible
with this meaning of "intimate conviction." Sometimes "intimate conviction"
is also taken to mean that all evidence is admissible, regardless of the degree
of its probative force.21 5 Under this alternative meaning, no reason appears
211. SCHAFF, op. cit. supra note 210, at 364 (citing VISHINSKY, op. cit. supra note
205, in a Polish edition).
212, The Communist view of "intimate conviction" is not new, for in 1907 Garraud
emphasized that the process of "intimate conviction"--even by jury-is not a purely
emotional process. See Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1360 n.210 (1959).
See also FL. CODE PROC. PnNALE arts. 485, 543, providing that every judgment must
contain "grounds of decision" which "constitute the basis of decision."
The Communist claim that the reality of facts varies depending on the economic and
social background of the fact finder is really an implied concession to the subjectivist
view. See SCHAFF, op. cit. supra note 210, at 389; KEmPISTY, METODYKA PRACY sEZIEGO
W SPRAWACH KARNYcH 118 (1955).
213. SCHAFF, op. cit. supra note 210, at 369-70, points out that the very first ordi-
nances of Soviet authority in Russia, concerning court organization and administration
of justice, used terms such as "revolutionary conscience and revolutionary legal con-
sciousness."
214. R.S.F.S.R. CODE CRa. PRoc. art. 257 (1923) (U.S..R.).
215. See, e.g., FPL CODE PROC. PENALE art. 427 (procedure before a tribunal cor-
rectional). In Switzerland, to the extent that federal law provides that the court must
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for singling out the oath as incompatible with intimate conviction, while ad-
mitting any other evidence that the judge may choose to admit.2 16 Thus,
whichever meaning of "intimate conviction" is adopted, Communist doctrine
offers no added reason for abolishing the oath on this ground. The assertion
that the oath's abolition is specifically dictated by Soviet jurisprudence is




As shown in the first part of this Article, in several Swiss cantons the
testimonial oath has practically disappeared by way of desuetude.218 The trend
toward abandonment of the oath, thus developed by custom, has been acceler-
ated by legislation which has reduced the oath practice to a minimum. The
Swiss Federal Law of Criminal Procedure has reduced oath taking to the
status of an exceptional measure.2 19 The Swiss Federal Law of Civil Pro-
cedure does not mention oaths at all, merely instructing the judge to admonish
the witness regarding his duty to tell the truth and criminal responsibility
imposed by the Penal Code upon false testimony.
220
Abandonment of the oath in the several Swiss jurisdictions is avowedly
traceable to tradition and absence of pragmatic need for such a device. It is
probably an outgrowth of Swiss judicial proceedings, which are realistic, plain,
and averse to dramatic effects.
221
CONTEMPORARY LEGISLATION ON PERJURY AND FALSE TESTIMONY
Civil Law Jurisdictions
Religious, social, and governmental views of perjury and false testimony
are reflected in varying degrees in the modern civil law.
decide in accordance with the principle of free evaluation, it has been said that evidence
must not be barred on the ground that it is presumptively useless within cantonal law.
GuTJDENER, BEWEISW0RDIGUNG UND BEwEISLAST NACH SCmWrZMuSCHEM ZIvnLPROZESS-
nECHT 4 (1955). However, in civil-law countries "free evaluation of the evidence" has
not been considered a ground of justification for the admission of evidence obtained by
unethical means. See KLEINXNECHT, MULLER & RITBERGER, KotmENTAR zuR STRAF-
PROZESSORDNUNG UND zum GascHTsvmFAssUNGsGEsrZ 220 (3d ed. 1954).
216. See R.S.F.S.R. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 57 (1923) (U.S.S.R.).
217. See :Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1376-78 (1959).
218. See id. at 1378-80.
219. See note 74 supra.
220. Bundesgesetz iiber den Bundeszivilprozess (Federal Civil Procedure Law) art.
45, para. 2 (Swit. 1947), in BUNDESRECHTSIPFLEGE 53 (Bundeskanzlei 1953). The penalty
provision is SwrT. ST. G.B. art. 307.
221. "The Swiss judge is a representative of the people-a people which has the
reputation of being sober and practical." FiuTzscHE, WIE MAX IN DER SCHWEIz REcHT
SPRICHT 77 (1948). In Switzerland, the judicial robe is unknown. Court room rhetorics,
flourishing in other civil law countries (particularly in France), are conspicuously absent.
On the simplicity of Swiss procedure, see id. at 77-80.
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The religious concept generally characterizes perjury as a crime against
religion, an instance of blasphemy, punishable without regard to its conse-
quences, the capacity in which the oath has been taken (witness or a party),
or the authority before whom it was taken (court or any other agency). Since
the crime is purely formal, relevancy of the statement is not required. More-
over, false testimony is merged with perjury.2 22 The contemporary public
administration concept of perjury protects the administration of justice, by
enforcing the state's claim to "truth. '223 The social view of perjury presents
that crime as an instance of falsum and is, therefore, predicated upon harm
done or jeopardy created by the false statement. And it follows that perjury
sanctions vary with the damage caused.
French law adopts the falsinm notion of perjury, as developed by the
Italians. 224 To constitute false testimony, there must be a statement made
under oath before a judicial authority,22 5 containing an alteration of truth
for the purpose of misleading the authority as to a relevant matter, and apt
to cause harm to individuals or society.226 The punishment varies depending
222. See KUTrNER, DIE junisT scHE NATUR DER PALscHEN BEWEISAUSsAGE 37-38
(1931).
Another version of the religious concept is the one, in accordance with Roman
tradition, which leaves the punishment of perjury to divine retribution, exempting it from
legal sanction. See RoussAtU DE LA COmBE, TRAiTk DEs ArIEiRES cRImIELL.S (1780).
Thus, the French Penal Code of 1791 did not impose any punishment upon perjury. On
the other hand, one might well describe as "religious" the position which imposes punish-
ment only upon perjury, leaving false unsworn testimony completely immune. Such
position is expressed in the present French rule. See GoYET, DRorr PENAL sP2CrAL § 665,
at 439 (7th rev. ed. Rousselet & Patin 1958).
223. The State's right to "truth" is generally discussed in context with the collateral
problem of the right to refuse testimony. Some writers assert that the latter right, as out-
growth of freedom of thought, constitutes the general rule and that the duty to testify is but
an exception to this rule. VETTER, PROBLEME DES ZEUGNISVERWEIGERUNGSREcHrTES 24 (1954).
For discussion of the history of the controversy in criminal cases see Pfenninger, Die
Wahrheitspflicht des Beschiddigten im schweizerischen Strafverfahren (,pts. 1-2), 53
ScmvamzrmscHE JuRIsTEN-ZEiTuNG 129, 145 (1957). See also Schultz, Falsche Ansciud-
digung, Irrefiihrung der Rechtspflege und falsches Zeugnis, 73 ScHwEvzzmscHE ZErT-
SCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT 213, 220-23 (1958) ; Walder, Das Verhor init den; Angeschuddig-
ten, in STRA"RozEss UND RcHTssTAAT 181-92 (1956).
224. See Silving, The Oath: 1, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1385 (1959).
225. Although the Code pinal does not expressly state the oath requirement in the
articles dealing with "faux t~noignage," FL. CODE P-NAL arts. 361-65, 367, it is not
disputed that the oath is an essential of the crime, GoYEr, op. cit. supra note 222, § 365,
at 439. The name "faux tintdignage" is used, "faux serment" being, reserved, as in the
Roman, older Canon, and Italian law, for the false party oath. By recent amendment,
the perjury sanction was also imposed upon false swearing before an administrative
agency. FR. CODE PfANAL art. 32, as amended, Ordonnance 'No. 58-1298, [1958] Journal
Officiel 11761. Previously, such sanction was imposed by special laws on false swearing
before parliamentary commissions and workmen's compensation agencies. Gov r, op. cit.
supra note 222, § 665.
226. Id. at 440. The fact that the witness lied to avoid self-incrimination is no
excuse. Moreover, intention to mislead justice is inferred from knowledge of the false-
hood. Ibid.
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on whether the perjury is committed in a criminal or a civil proceeding, and,
in the case of the former, on whether the testimony was rendered against or in
support of the accused, and on the punishment imposed upon the accused.
227
The falsumr concept is clearly the foundation of the Austrian provisions on
perjury and false testimony. The Austrian Penal Code of 1852 228 mentions
the false party oath and false testimony before a court as occasions whereby
"fraud becomes a major crime by virtue of the very manner of its commis-
sion.1229 But this classification of perjury and false testimony is no longer
fully valid. False testimony and perjury now constitute independent crimes,
the actus reus of which need not be supplemented by elements of fraud.V 30
When, however, the false testimony or oath occurs in the context of fraud,
an intent to cause damage to property or other rights is essential. In addition,
whenever the false testimony or oath concurs with fraud, the latter is ipso facto
transformed from a minor to a major offense.
Efforts to adjust Austrian legislation to the more modern theory of perjury
as a crime against the administration of justice were met with the difficulty
of reconciling this theory with the falsum requirement of intent to cause harm.
This philosophical dilemma was resolved by reasoning that since the court
has a claim to truthfulness, any intent to mislead the court by false testimony
or perjury is sufficient evidence of intent to interfere with the administration
of justice.23' One writer has pointed out, however, that this interpretation does
227. In cases involving major crimes, false testimony is basically punishable by
imprisonment, but if the accused was convicted to a heavier punishment, the false witness
who testified against him is subject to the same punishment. FR. CoDE PENIAL art. 361.
In cases involving minor crimes, the basic punishment imposed upon the false witness
is imprisonment from two to five years and a fine of 50,000 to 750,000 francs. If the
accused was convicted and sentenced to over five years of imprisonment, however, the
witness who falsely testified against him is subject to the same punishment. In matters
of contravention (minor criminal prosecutions initiated by private complaint), the false wit-
ness is subject to a basic punishment of one year to three years and to a fine of 50,000 to
180,000 francs. In addition, the false witness in the last two instances may be subject
to a loss of civic rights. FR. 'CODE PENAL art. 362, as amended, Law of December 29,
1956, art. 7. In major-crime cases, such forfeiture is mandatory.
The punishment is aggravated only where the witness testified falsely against the
accused and not where he testified in his favor. Clearly, these provisions have been influenced
by the Bible.
228. Now Aus. STR. G.; see KANAI, DAs 6STERREICHISCHE STRAFGESErz (4th ed.
1956).
229. Section 199 provides:
Fraud becomes a major crime by virtue of the very manner of its commission:
a) where a person offers to swear a false oath or actually swears a false oath
in his own cause, or where a person tries to induce a false testimony to be
given in court, or offers or takes a false testimony in court, even if the latter
does not at the same time comprise the offer or the taking of an oath. ...
230. 2 RITTLER, LEmunUCH DES 6STmUCISCHEN STRAFRCcHTs 288 (1938).
231. See Judgment of May 27, 1946, Oberster Gerichtshof, 19 Entscheidungen des
Obersten Gerichtshofes in Strafsachen [hereinafter cited as O.G.H. St.] No. 8 (Aus.),
cited in KANIAK, op. cit. supra note 228, § 199, at 421 n.6.
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not accord with the general notion of fraud, which is a crime of specific intent,
so that the intent must reach beyond the actus reus. In his view, because the
crimes concerned are not offenses against the court's claim to truth, but
offenses against the administration of justice, the intent of the witness must
be directed to bringing about a court decision which would be different from
that which the court might presumably render but for the testimony.2 32 Ac-
cordingly, the witness who lies in order not to incur a loss of prestige, in the
belief that his statement will not affect the decision, is not punishable. The
Austrian Supreme Court, however, has reaffirmed the view of false testimony
as a formal crime against the administration of justice.
233
The Italian Penal Code classifies the false party oath and false testimony
together under "crimes against the administration of justice. ' ' 23 4 While the
idea of falsum has been abandoned, actual jeopardy of the object of protection,
i.e., the administration of justice, is nonetheless required. Such jeopardy is
assumed to be present only when there is a possibility that the false statement
may influence the decision.235 While false testimony is punishable although
there is no possibility of damage to a party, potential damage to the other
party is necessary for punishment of a false party oath.236 Thus, as Austria,
proceeding from a statutory falsumn theory of false testimony, is in practice
applying the protection of public administration concept, so Italy, proceeding
from the latter position, tends to introduce falsumn elements into practice.
In Swiss and German law, the dominant perjury and false testimony pattern
is that described as "governmental thinking," illlustrated by the phrase:
"sacredness of the oath [now also unsworn testimony] in the service of
the State. '237 In the Swiss Federal Penal Code, the crimes of "false evi-
dentiary statement of a party" in a civil case, and of "false testimony," are
clearly viewed as "Major and Minor Crimes against the Administration of
Justice. ' -35  Both crimes are purely formal; they are consummated as soon
as the statement is made. It is unnecessary that "any consequence in the ex-
232. 2 R7rrLER, op. cit. supra note 230, at 294.
233. See Judgment of May 27, 1946, Oberster Gerichtshof, 19 O.G.H. St. No. 8
(Aus.).
Austria was a leader in introducing the crime of false unsworn testimony, see Criminal
Code of Joseph II of 1787 [Josephina]. The oath, however, has particular significance
in the case of parties in a civil case. Their false statements are punishable only if made
under oath. This limitation was necessary in order to resolve the difficult problem of
drawing a line between a mere party allegation and an evidentiary party statement. See
2 RIrrLER, op. cit. supra note 230, at 297.
234. ITAL. CODICE PENAI arts. 371 (false oath of a party), 372 (false testimony).
235. See Judgment of Nov. 22, 1955, Corte di Cassazione (Sezione III), 61
GIUSTIZIA PENALE pt. 2, at 715 (Italy).
236. See KUTrNER, op. cit. supra note 222, at 57, 60.
237. See id. at 40.
238. See SwiT. ST. G.B. arts. 306-07; Schultz, supra note 223, at 225. Other offenses
included as crimes against the administration of justice are "false accusation" of another,
SwiT. ST. G.B. art. 303, "misleading of the administration of justice by false self-accusa-
tion," SwiT. ST. G.B. art. 304. See also ITAL. CODICE PENALE art. 369.
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ternal world, distinct from the conduct of the actor, be effected."230 Rectifica-
tion of the false statement by the actor sua sponte before a legal disadvantage
to another person has occurred may, however, be considered by the judge, in
his discretion, as a ground for reducing or foregoing punishment 2 40 Con-
sistently with "governmental thinking," the Swiss law punishes irrelevant
false statements, although the penalty is considerably smaller than that which
would have been imposed had the statements been relevant.
241
In Germany, the "governmental thinking" concept has been steadily gaining
ground. The last vestige of the faisum concept of perjury was abandoned when
the provision for increase of punishment for perjury when the testimony
resulted in a detriment to the accused was repealed. 242 Thus, "the good old
view that false testimony is punished not only because it misleads the authority
but also because and to the extent that it causes dange to another"243 came
to an end. The present German position was thus expressed by the Great
Senate in Criminal Matters of the Bundesgerichtshof: "The threats of pun-
ishment imposed on all crimes of false testimony serve the protection of the
administration of justice; the wrongfulness of false testimony consists in
jeopardy of the administration of justice. '244 Germany, like Switzerland,
punishes false testimony regardless of its relevancy.245 Since this reaches
beyond actual governmental interest, it has been suggested that the law is
plainly "moralizing. '246 This "moralizing" tendency has been said also to
be expressed in the peculiar result that unsuccessful instigation of another
to commit perjury is punished more severely than consciously causing an
erroneous decision. 4T Indeed, this feature of German law is reminiscent of
the old view of the Italian school, derived from the canon law, holding the
instigator who commits "murder of the soul" more blameworthy than the
principal actor.248 While the above cited Great Senate decision has been
239. Schultz, supra note 223, at 225, 226. See also Guinand v. Procureur g6n6ral du
Canton de Neuchitel, Bundesgericht, Dec. 3, 1943, 69(IV.) Entscheidungen des Schweizer-
ischen Bundesgerichts [hereinafter cited as S.B.G.] 211, 216 (Swit.).
240. SwiT. ST. G.B. art. 308, para. 1.
24L Compare Swrr. ST. G.B. art. 307, para. 1 (five years maximum imprisonment for
relevant statements), with SwiT. ST. G.B. art. 307, para. 3 (six months imprisonment for
irrelevant statements).
242. The provision was repealed by a Regulation of January 20, 1944, [1944] 1 R.G. Bl.
44 (Ger.). The present provision, GaR. ST. G.B. § 154, now reads: "A person who before
a court or before another agency competent to administer oaths intentionally swears falsely
shall be punished by imprisonment in a penitentiary. Where there are mitigating
circumstances, the punishment shall be imprisonment for not less than six months."
243. 2 KoiLRAuSCH, SrRAGEsETZBUCH § 152, comment I, 3(d), at 329 (41st ed.
Lange 1956). (Emphasis added.)
244. Judgment of Oct. 24, 1955, Bundesgerichtshof (Grosser Strafsenat), 8 B.G.H.
St. 301 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
245. 2 KoHLRAUscHr, op. cit. supra note 243, § 152, comment II, 2.
246: Ibid.
247. Compare GER. ST. G.B. § 159 with Gm. ST. G.B. §§ 49a, 160.
248. See voN Lisz, Dm FALscHz AUSSAGE 168 (1877).
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hailed as having put an end to the "religious" view treating perjury and
false testimony as distinctive crimes,249 the opinion of the court does not seem
to carry such secular implications. 2 50 The German law extends protection of
the state from false testimony indiscriminately to all agencies competent to
hear witnesses, or experts, or to administer oaths. 25 1 In contrast to the Swiss
law, which insists that intent in the crime of false testimony must be unquali-
fied,25 2 German law is satisfied with the so-called dolus eventuali. 253 Finally,
the German law, unlike the Swiss,2 5 4 includes a provision for the punishment
of negligent perjury.2 55 Both the Swiss and the German law follow the
"objectivist" approach, according to which statements which are objectively
true but subjectively false are not subject to punishment for perjury or false
testimony.2 50  In the converse situation, of course, punishment is excluded
(except, in Germany, in the case of negligent perjury) because there is no
intent. But since both Switzerland and Germany follow the subjectivist theory
249. For the older view, see Judgment of Oct. 25, 1951, Bundesgerichtshof (IV.
Strafsenat), 1 B.G.H. St. 380 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
250. While emphasizing that "the unsworn false testimony of GER. ST. G.B. § 153
is the basic crime" and "the affirmation on oath . . . but an aggravating feature," and
that "the element that justifies punishment is ...the false statement," the court also
pointed out that "the oath, to the extent that it invokes God, has a sacral character,
although not all those who take oaths today are aware'of that fact."
This case was construed narrowly in the Decision of March 22, 1957, Bundesge-
ricbtshof (I. Strafsenat), 10 N.J.W. 1886 (Ger. Fed. Rep.), and was practically disre-
garded in Decision of Feb. 28, 1956, Bundesgerichtshof (I. Strafsenat), 9 N.J.W. 1038
(Ger. Fed. Rep.).
251. Ga. ST. G.B. §§ 153 (false testimony), 154 (perjury).
252. Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Aangau v. Morganthaler, Bundesgericht, Dec. 1,
1950, 76(IV.) S.B.G. 243 (Swit.).
253. See 2 KOiaLRAUSCH, op. cit. supra note 243, § 154, comment V, at 340. There
is dolus eventualis when the actor does not intend the actirs reus (here the falsehood)
but would approve of it should it be present. Decision of Dec. 20, 1937, Reichsgericht
(II. Strafsenat), 72 R.G. St. 36, 43 (Ger.).
254. Swiss legislators specifically rejected an attempt to punish negligent false
testimony, in view of the variety of psychological factors which condition testimony. See
Schultz, supra note 223, at 220.
255. GER. ST. G.B. § 163. There is no provision for negligent unsworn false
testimony, as defined in Gm ST. G.B. § 153.
German decisional law has permitted conviction for negligent false swearing without
clear proof of whether the accused had committed the crime intentionally or negligently.
Judgment of Sept. 22, 1953, Bundesgerichtshof (V. Strafsenat), 4 B.G.H. St. 320 (Ger.
Fed. Rep.). This ruling shows a particular zeal in enforcing perjury sanctions, for it
departs from the general rule that conviction on "alternative facts" (Wahfeststellung)
is permissible only when the alternative acts charged are "legally-ethically and psychologi-
cally comparable." Decision of May 2, 1934, dReichsgericht (Vereinigte Strafsenate), 68
R.G. St. 257 (Ger.). The 1953 decision was subsequently criticized in Decision of Oct. 15,
1956, Bundesgerichtshof (Grosser Strafsenat), 9 B.G.H. St. 390, 393 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
256. See Schultz, supra note 223, at 223-24, 252-54 (Swiss law; collecting authori-
ties) ; 2 KoHLRAUscH, op. cit. supra note 243 § 153 comment at 336 (German law;
collecting authorities).
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of attempt,25 7 the declarant who believes his statement to be false although in
fact it is true would seem to be subject to punishment for attempted false
testimony. The Swiss Federal Tribunal has held, however, that no crime
of attempted false testimony exists because the policy of the law is to en-
courage the witness to correct falsehoods by granting him immunity until
the crime is consummated. 258 In Germany, recent legislation abolished the
offense of attempted false testimony, but not that of attempted perjury.0 0
Since the oath is taken after the testimony is rendered, beginning to take the
oath constitutes commencement of the execution. 260
After 1935, the German Reichsgericht took the position that complicity in
perjury may be committed by intentional failure to frustrate the perjury of
another.20 1 As in other instances of crime by omission, the existence of a duty
to act was assumed to be essential. While such duty was in principle held
to apply to an attorney of a party in a civil case, to civil parties, and to a
criminally accused, 262 no clarity existed regarding the nature of the conditions
giving rise to a duty to intervene. At no time has it been denied that "there
is no general duty imposed on all citizens to expose a false testimony of a
witness, which the person concerned knows to be false. 20 3 The view that
mere participation in a lawsuit, as a party or as counsel, gives rise to such
a duty under the rule requiring parties to cooperate in truth finding 2 4 -a view
resulting in the rather unrealistic position that an attorney must expose false
testimony favorable to his client 265-was soon abandoned. It was held that
the duty to act is predicated upon prior conduct which was somehow instru-
mental in creating the danger of perjury.2 60 But once the duty is established,
the person concerned was held not to be released merely because compliance
would result in his own exposure to prosecution or dishonor; he must "accept
the punishment for wrong he had committed rather than suffer new wrong
to be done which he had himself originally promoted.1
2 7
In evaluating these decisions, it is significant to note the time of their issu-
ance. They clearly show the impact of the Nazi subordination of individual
257. See Ryu, Contemporary Problenms of Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1170, 1187-89 (1957).
258. Mathys v. Staatsanvaltschaft des Kantons Solothurn, Bundesgericht, June 25,
1954, 80(IV.) S.B.G. 123 (Swit.).
259. Law of August 4, 1953, [1953] 1 B.G. Bl. 735 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
260. See Judgment of Jan. 3, 1957, Bundesgerichtshof (IV. Strafsenat), 10 B.G.H.
St. 126 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
261. See BocKELmAxN, STRAFPaCTUC1 E UNMRSUCHUNGEN 126-34 (1957).
262. See cases cited in id. at 129-34.
263. Decision of March 26, 1943, Reichsgericht (IV. Strafsenat), 13 DEUTSCHES
RECHT 748 (Ger.).
264. See GER. Z.P.O. § 138.
265. Judgment of Jan. 13, 1936, Reichsgericht (II. Strafsenat), 70 R.G. St. 82, 84
(Ger.).
266. See BOCKELMANN, op. cit. supra note 261, at 127-28.




interest to community duty. While stress of the latter still dominates certain
postwar decisions, 2 8 later decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof have increasingly
narrowed the concept of perjury by omission. The Bundesgerichtshof par-
ticularly refused to impute a duty to intervene to an attorney. Such a duty
does not exist unless the accused, by his prior conduct, had placed the witness
in "a special danger of perjury, in excess of the danger flowing from the
[normal] course of procedure," such as the normal danger in calling a witness
who has an economic interest in the outcome of the case.26 9
Protection of the individual when his interests conflict with those of the
community has been reflected in civil-law countries by the privileged treat-
ment of perjury and false testimony when these crimes are committed in a
state of necessity. The phenomenon of "perjury in a state of necessity" is
rather peculiar, since it occurs precisely in those systems in which legally,
ethically, and philosophically it might be least expected.
Italy, which grants a witness no privilege to refuse to give self-incriminating
testimony, 270 affords him complete immunity when he lies "under compulsion
of necessity of saving himself or a near relative from a grave and inevitable
damage to freedom or honor."271 The Corte di Cassazione has even applied
this immunity to a witness who had brought about the prosecution of her
brother by informing against him, and then falsely retracted her previous
statement upon his trial.272 This holding extended immunity beyond the
scope of ordinary rules of "necessity," which cannot usually be invoked when
the necessity is self-induced.27 3 In another case the same court said in obiter
that a "necessity" lie is not merely excused but, indeed, justified, so that the
act is not illegal.2 7 4 For the immunity provision is deemed "to reflect the morality
of the majority of the citizens who in an identical situation would have acted
in the same manner as did the person concerned." 27 5 The view prevails in
268. See BOCKELMANN, op. cit. supra note 261, at 127-28.
269. Judgment of Aug. 20, 1953, Bundesgerichtshof (I. Strafsenat), 4 B.G.H. St. 327
(Ger.).
270. But Italy grants a privilege to refuse to testify in cases involving certain close
relatives. See ITAL. CoDIcE PRoc. P.ENALE art. 350 (incorporating ITAL. CODICS PENALE
art. 307, para. 3).
271. ITAL. CowIcE PENALE art. 384.
272. Decision of June 3, 1957, Corte di cassazione (Sezione III), 63 GIusrialA
PENALE pt. 2, at 19-23.
273. The Corte di cassazione pointed out that the court below had erroneously
invoked the general provision on the "state of necessity," ITAI- CODICE PENALE art. 54,
which provides that the danger which excuses the "necessary" action must not be one
voluntarily created by the actor, "since art. 384, Penal Code, constitutes a special form
of the state of necessity."
274. Decision of May 2, 1957, Corte di Cassazione (Sezione III), 62 GiusTiziA
PENALE pt. 2, at 513-14. This was a case of false "self-accusation" (autocalumia),
within ITAL. CODICE PEAIx art. 369, to which art. 384 is also applicable.
275. In the court's view, this situation is distinguishable from those instances where
only punishment is withheld, e.g., retraction of false party oaths or false testimony, ITAI_
CODICE PENALE art. 376, where a "violation of the relation of penal obedience, that is, a
fundamental inconsistency with the ends of the criminal legal order, remains active."
19s91 1565
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
legal literature that the Italian provision concerning necessity lying extends to
cases where a witness could refuse testimony and is duly advised of his
privilege of not testifying.
2 7
0
Although less far-reaching than the Italian rule, the German provision
governing necessity lying 277 is more striking, since it contrasts with both the
dominant Kantian conception of a lie as man's denial of his own dignity and
identity,2 78 and the German idea that the perjury sanction serves to protect
the state.2 7 9 Necessity here excludes or diminishes culpability-not illegality;
for this rule does not afford mandatory immunity, or even mitigation, but
authorizes the judge, in his reasonable discretion, to reduce or forego punish-
ment.28 0 When, however, the conditions of necessity perjury are present, the
accused does not forfeit his civic rights.2 8 ' Indeed, he cannot thereafter be
denied capacity to take an oath, even though the punishment was not miti-
gated.2 8 2 As in the general law of necessity, the interest to be saved by neces-
sity lying need not be weightier than the interest sacrificed.2 8 3 But a person
276. Boascarelli, Sulle scriminanti previste dall'articolo 384 c.p. in rapporto alla falsa
testimonianza, 57 GiusriziA PuNAix pt. 2, at 965 (1952); 2 ANTOLISEI, MANUALE DI
naUTTO PENALE 736 (1954). But see Decision of June 30, 1951, Corte di Cassazione
(Sezione III) (holding that ITAL. CoDicE PENALE art. 384 does not apply where the
testimony was voluntary).
277. Gun. ST. G.B. § 157, para. 1:
Where a witness or an expert has been guilty of perjury, or a false statement
in lieu of an oath or a false unsworn testimony, the judge may, in his reasonable
discretion, mitigate the punishment and in the case of an unswom testimony forego
the punishment entirely, if the actor has stated the untruth in order to avert from
a relative or from himself the danger of a judicial punishment.
278. The definition of a lie requires no statement that it damages another. For it
always damages mankind generally, since it shatters the belief in statements and
thereby renders the legal source useless. A lie, "aliud lingua promptum, alind pectore
inchsnm gerere," is the greatest violation of the duty of man to himself, considered
merely as an ethical being (humanity in his own person). "Mendacitu , externon-
intermnun'; by the latter even more than by the former man makes himself an object
of contempt in his own eyes and violates the dignity of mankind in his own person.
The damage (as a consequence of the lie) is not in issue, otherwise the consideration
would be an instance of the maxim of wisdom not of morality. A liar has less value
than a thing (that is, not even a price). Language is the natural capacity for com-
munication of ideas; a lie is thus contrary to nature. Nevertheless, falsehood seems
to be rooted in human nature.
Summary of Kant's view made by Gorland, Der Begriff der Lilge im System der Etliker
von Spinoza bis sur Gegenwart, in Dia LiGE 154 (Lipmann & Plaut ed. 1927).
279. See text at note 226 supra.
280. See 2 KoimaAuscH, op. cit. supra note 243, § 157, comment VII, at 346.
281. Gn. ST. G.B. § 161.
282. Judgment of Feb. 5, 1957, Bundesgerichtshof (V. Strafsenat), 10 N.J.W. 550
(Ger. Fed. Rep.).
283. In the case of so-called "extra-statutory necessity" the interest saved must be
greater than that sacrificed. See Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal
Law, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 350, 357 n.28 (1954).
And general necessity rules are independently applicable to perjury. See Judgment
of Nov. 11, 1932, Reichsgericlt (I. Strafsenat), 66 R.G. St. 397 (Ger.).
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may rely on a situation of danger which he had knowingly brought about
himself. Here, the Bundesgerichtshof has relied on the analogous rule of
self-defense, according to which it is irrelevant if the actor had brought
about the assault.2 8 4 And, "on the one hand, persons entitled to refuse testi-
mony who choose to testify may, nevertheless, rely on § 157, while, on the
other hand, the privilege is not open to the taker of the insolvent debtor's
oath, although he undoubtedly testifies under compulsion.
'28 5
In general, the distinctive institution of "perjury in a state of necessity"
stems from medieval theological doctrine which takes account of man's instinct
of self-preservation. Of course, it also fits into the modem theory that the
gravity of the crime depends on its context. Finally, it corresponds to psycho-
logical findings that voluntariness of human action is not an absolute but a
relative matter-a view that has superseded the legalistic notion of stringent
separation of voluntary and compulsory action.
2 8 6
Common Law Jurisdictions
A comparative study of perjury in common-law countries must take into
account the distinctive rules governing the oath, as contrasted with those prevail-
ing in civil-law countries. Perjury, as distinguished from crimes founded on
life events not necessarily related to law,28 7 is an offense committed with official
284. See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1955, Bundesgerichtshof (Grosser Strafsenat), 8
B.G.H. St. 301, 318 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
285. MAURACH, DEUTSCHES STRAFREc-T-BEsoNDEER T.IL 519 (1953).
Until 1947, Gm. ST. G.B. § 157 was applicable only if statement of the truth would
objectively produce the danger of the witness' criminal prosecution for crime, without
regard to his awareness of the danger. After amendment of the rule by an Ordinance
of May 29, 1947, however, "the condition of the application of § 157 is the intention of
the witness, by stating the untruth, to avert from a relative or from himself the danger
of a judicial punishment." See Judgment of Oct. 24, 1955, Bundesgerichtshof (Grosser
Strafsenat), supra note 284, at 318. The provision is also applicable if the witness errone-
ously assumes the existence of such danger. Judgment of Feb. 19, 1.926, Reichsgericht
(I. Strafsenat), 60 R.G. St. 101 (Ger.). And the intention to avert the danger need
not be the only motive for stating the untruth. Ibid. See also Judgment of Oct. 24, 1955,
Bundesgerichtshof (Grosser Strafsenat), supra note 284, at 317.
286. The policy that gave rise to the concept of "necessity lying" is the same as
that which produced the immunity based on "necessity" generally. This policy was ex-
pressed by the Reichsgericht thus:
[T]he realization that there is, besides the complete lack of free will caused
by a mental state within the meaning of Gum ST. G.B. § 51, [insanity], which
by its very nature has the effect of excluding guilt, also an extraordinary im-
pairment of free will, caused by external circumstances, as usual psychological
pressure, which, considering the instinct of self-preservation and the related drive
to preserve the life of near relatives, makes conduct in accordance with law
appear as "not to be expected!' (nicht momutbar) and hence the legal violation as
"excusable"....
Judgment of Nov. 11, 1932, Reichsgericht (I. Strafsenat), 66 R.G. St. 397 (Ger.).
287. Murder furnishes a ready example.
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cooperation. This "official cooperation" factor is particularly conspicuous
when a person is indicted for perjury committed in his own trial for crime.
Although technically perjury may not be the "fruit" of the indictment or trial
in such cases, it is certainly the product of the questionable "privilege" of
testifying under oath in one's own case. This dubious "choice" of testifying
leads to such bizarre situations as that presented in United States v. Reinig-
ton,288 which upheld defendant's conviction for what amounted to testifying
falsely under oath that he had testified truthfully before. True, on the assump-
tion that the crime of perjury is not the "result" of the trial, there is no tech-
nical "entrapment," but as pointed out by Judge Learned Hand, the first
indictment is "as direct a provocation of the perjury" for which the accused
is now being prosecuted "as the persuasion of agents or officials of the prose-
cution would have been, had they 'incited' or 'instigated' him to perjure
himself. '289 The inequity so eloquently described by Judge Hand is not actu-
ally distinguishable from that obtaining in any other case in which a person
is prosecuted for perjury committed by him in his own trial for crime. Where
failure to take the stand is "equivalent to a plea of guilty,"2 90 perjury is "pro-
voked," if not "incited" or "instigated." For this reason, as well as the heavy
conflict of conscience produced in the accused's mind, civil-law countries have
prohibited administration of the oath to the accused in a criminal case, and
grant total or partial impunity to persons who perjure themselves when the
choice is between perjury and grave harm to the perjurer or persons close
to him.
Another dubious feature of common-law perjury legislation is a develop-
ment in the direction of a "public administration concept" of perjury, and
toward the type of "governmental thinking," that characterizes contemporary
Swiss and German law. In the Remington case the false statement under oath
was material to another perjury, but not to any crime directly harmful to any
individual or the community, demonstrating that the interest protected by
the punishment of perjury is integrity of the administration of justice per se.
While there can be no quarrel with the policy of protecting judicial admini-
stration, regardless of its functioning, in view of the abstract nature of the
interest involved, there is no justification for making harmless perjury a
felony.29' Perjury was not a felony at common law, even though it was
288. 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954). Defendant,
convicted in a previous trial of perjuring himself before a grand jury, had obtained a
reversal on the ground of error in the judge's charge to the jury. United States v.
Remington, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 907 (1952). In the second
case the government alleged that the defendant had perjured himself in the first trial.
His conviction for that perjury was affirmed.
289. 208 F.2d at 575 (dissent).
290. Ibid.
291. Perjury is generally treated as a felony in the United States. PsauIxs, Cans-
INAL LAw 383 (1957). The sanctions attaching to perjury are generally quite severe.
Indeed, Michigan, MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.664 (1954), imposes life imprisonment.
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conceived as a crime against religion.2 9 2 Apparently, the state, using the Name
of God to symbolize its own "sovereignty," has developed perjury into a tool
of theologically tainted "governmental thinking," more comprehensive than
religious thinking ever was.
In contrast to French law, 20 3 the common law, subject to certain exceptions,
draws no distinction between a man whose false testimony puts his own father
to death and a man whose false testimony convicts a neighboring house-
holder of laying rubbish on the highway. 294 Failure to vary the punishment
for perjury "according to the nature of the mischief"'29 5 permits an indictment
and conviction for "perjury in the alternative"-deliberately taking oath to
contradictory statements-since one statement may work harm, while the
other may not.29 6 Perjury conviction in the alternative precludes considera-
tion of special circumstances under which a particular false statement may
have been made. The uniformity and rigidity of the perjury concept in our
law bar introduction of "perjury in a state of necessity," as known in civil-law
countries. 297 Failure to give consideration to situations of profound ethical
conflict and psychological stress is strangely inconsistent with our pragmatic
and utilitarian culture.
Disregard of the "mischief" actually or potentially produced is evident in
recent trends to eliminate the requirement of perjury's materiality, to intro-
duce punishment for attempted perjury, and to emphasize the subjective
character of perjury. The requirement of materiality has been losing its
efficacy as a limiting factor since the narrow concept of materiality as a
"logical" relationship between the false statement and the ultimate proposition
to be proven began to yield to a broad interpretation of "material" as anything
which in the light of experience may have a bearing, however remote, on the
ultimate proposition.29 3 Such a bearing is called "pertinency"; and "material,"
292. Perjury was a misdemeanor, although it carried the brand of infamy. PERKINS,
op. cit. surpa note 291, at 382. Contrary to Perkins' view, id. at 382 n.1, it is likely
that at one time perjury of witnesses was not punishable at common law, for this was
true of all early, religiously inspired law which assumed that perjury is subject to direct
Divine retribution. On the development of the crime of perjury, see MODEL PENAL CODE
101-02 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
293. See text at note 227 supra.
294. 1 BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDIc AL EviDENCE 366-67 (1827).
295. See ibid.
296. See Whitman, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Perjury in Our Courts,
59 DicK. L. REv. 127, 128-29 (1955) (collecting statutes). But see United States v.
Buckner, 118 F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1941) ("It is strange that in the federal courts an
indictment for perjury may not yet be drawn in the alternative, and that there may not
be a conviction for deliberately making oath to contradictory statements, unless the prose-
cutor shows which of the statements was false.").
In Germany, conviction on alternative finding is permissible. See Judgment of Oct.
15, 1956, Bundesgerichtshof (Grosser Strafsenat), 9 B.G.H. St. 390 (Ger. Fed. Rep.) ;
Judgment of May 2, 1934, Reichsgericht (Vereinigte 'Strafsenate), 68 R.G. St. 257 (Ger.).
297. Compare texct at notes 270-86 supra.
298. See United States v. Cameron, 282 Fed. 684 (D. Ariz. 1922), in which the
defendant was accused of falsely testifying as to the amount of political contributions
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as distinct from "pertinent," must mean "not only pertinent but also import-
ant in some substantial degree." 29 u0 "Important" would seem to mean that the
probability of harm must be great. But this test, implying an objective proba-
bility relationship, apparently was not applied in Robinson v. United States,300
where a perjury conviction was upheld for making false statements in an
application for a marriage license, regardless of whether the declarant was
objectively entitled to a license. The test the court advanced was "whether
such statements had a natural tendency to influence the clerk in his investiga-
tion of the facts, in the exercise of his official discretion, and in the administra-
tion of the law." 30 1 A breakdown of the objective "materiality" test was
avoided by assuming that the purpose of the licensing statute was to promote
investigation, exercise of discretion, and recording rather than to secure
issuance of licenses when marriage impediments do not in fact exist. 30 2 In
the New York case of People v. Clemente,30 3 "material" seems to have been
interpreted to mean anything that might psychologically sway the decision
maker. The avowedly psychological nature of materiality was, in fact, advanced
as ground for assigning determination of materiality to the jury rather than
to the court. The net effect of such assignment is increased protection for
the accused, since a jury "may indulge tender mercies even to the point of
acquitting the plainly guilty, '30 while the court retains the power of with-
holding the issue from the jury because of insufficient evidence. The genuine
reason for such generosity, however, would seem to be recognition of the
insufficiency of conventional perjury legislation, evidenced by the Law Re-
vision Commission's finding of "the high incidence of perjury and the low
incidence of convictions." 30 But instead of limiting punishment for false
testimony to cases of actual harm and varying it in accordance with the degree
he had received in support of his candidacy for office. The testimony had occurred in
a prosecution for campaign expenditures beyond the statutory amount. The legal ques-
tion involved in the perjury action as to whether a statement concerning receipts was
"material" to a determination of expenditures. If "material" is construed to denote a
narrow logical relationship, then receipts may not be material to questions of expenditures;
the two may be unrelated. But if "materiality" is tested by empirical probability-here that
political contributions will be spent-one could conclude that a lie concerning receipts is
material to a determination of expenditures. The court reversed the defendant's conviction.
299. It is one thing to say that if a committee were authorized to investigate
pneumonia, the life-long clinical history of a man believed to have had pneumonia
might be pertinent to the inquiry. It would be quite another thing to say that
if he testified he had six colds in one winter ten years ago, whereas in fact he
had only five, he could be indicted and punished for perjury.
United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (dissenting opinion).
300. 114 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
301. Id. at 476.
302. Ibid.
303. 285 App. Div. 258, 136 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1954), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 890, 131 N.E2d
294 (1955).
304. 285 App. Div. at 264, 136 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
305. Id. at 261, 136 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
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of harm, the New York Law Revision Commission's recommendation ob-
viously aims at facilitating convictions, by introducing the concept of second
degree perjury not requiring materiality. 06 The question remains wherein
lies the social harm of an "immaterial lie." An alternative method of punish-
ing perjury, when either materiality or jurisdiction is lacking, is recognition
of attempted perjury as an offense. Such step was taken in State v. Latiolais,
307
a most unfortunate decision, since it was unmindful of the significant social
function of "jurisdiction" as a device of individual protection against abuse of
power. A third approach is the "subjective theory," whereby the falsehood
of an allegedly perjurious statement is tested against the declarant's belief
rather than against objective reality.308 Since mnens rea is essential, so that
the subjective belief of the accused in the falsehood of his statement must be
shown within this context, the only situation in which adoption of the sub-
jective theory is practically significant is that where the statement of the
declarent is objectively true though he believes it to be false.30 9 As pointed
out by the commentators on the Model Penal Code, "not much good and some
harm might come from applying the criminal law" to "one who has, objec-
tively, told the truth .... Encouraging the police to inquire as to subjective
dishonesty behind the objective truth would not only waste their time, but
opens substantial possibility of abuse."310 But is not the same criticism ap-
plicable to immaterial falsehoods, attempted perjury, harmless falsehoods?
CONCLUSION
History shows that today's oath is closely related to the self-curse of
ancient times. Undoubtedly, the religious oath in our contemporary culture
reflects the Biblical oath pattern. And the veiled language of the Bible indi-
cates that even in the pre-Law era, earlier experiences bearing on the contents
of the self-curse had already partly been repressed.3 11 Thus, the modern
306. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1620-h.
307. 225 La. 878, 74 So. 2d 148 (1954) ; see Mann, Attempted Perjury-The Rides
of "Legal" and "Factual" Impdssibility as Applied to the Law of Criminal Attempts,
33 N.C.L. REv. 641 (1955).
308. But seeMoDEL. PENAL CODE § 208.20, comment at 116-18 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957)
(severely critical of this approach).
309. This rule was adopted in the first Retington case, United States v. Remington,
191, F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 907 (1952), in which the court held
that where the indictment charged Remington did not believe his denial of membership in
the Communist Party, the allegation "that he had in fact been a member of the Party was
surplusage....:
310. MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.20, comment at 118 (Tent Draft No. 6, 1957).
311. See GtmN , GENESIs 250-51 (3d rev. ed. 1910), suggesting that the Biblical
oath contains remnants of the custom which considered "the genitals as the divine in man."
Gunkel goes on to say: "Here, in Genesis 24, this view itself was long since lost; the mores
had become so bashful that only a remote hint at this custom is permissible; but the custom
-as is often the case-continues... "
Freud has shown that traces of archaic thinking can be detected in seemingly rational
customs and institutions of today. FREUD, Totem und Tabu, in 9 GESAmmELTE WERK:c
190 (1940).
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judicial oath may include remnants of the primitive self-curses of pagan,
prereligious and, indeed, preanimistic ages, and of obscure, anxiety-inspiring
experiences which are hinted at in Biblical passages. These archaic remnants
of the early oath seem to have affected the pre-Law Biblical man so deeply
that he dared not give clear expression to the nature of the oath's sanction.
They are bound to affect the unconscious of the contemporary oath taker. The
anxiety--"pahad"-they evoke is likely to disturb the spontaneity of his testi-
mony and his conscious efforts to reconstruct a past observation correctly.
For these reasons, abolition of the oath should be given serious consideration.
The desirability of abolition is corroborated by a modern reevaluation of
the rules of self-incrimination and confession, to which the oath is closely
related.312 Essentially a self-curse, the oath is an anticipatory self-condemna-
tion or self-incrimination, carrying a promise of confession. Thus, many of the
arguments against compulsory self-incrimination and confession seem ap-
plicable to a compulsory oath. The inadequacy of our law of these phenomena,
evidenced by the contradictions involved in the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation,313 as well as the inconsistent approaches of law and religion to the
confession problem, 314 and the puzzling aspects of many false confessions, may
stem from law's roots in a misconception of man's nature. Our law presup-
poses man to be a perfectly rational being, who weighs profit against loss
with the precision of a calculating machine and, at the same time, is the most
lenient judge of his own sins. Law presumes that man will always wish to
testify in his own behalf when he is innocent and that he will never, except on
rational grounds, or under external coercion, make a false confession. There-
fore, we bar coerced confessions and compulsory self-accusation, while
312. On the need for such reevaluation, see Judge Frank's dissenting opinion in
United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 571, 592 (2d Cir. 1956), rcv'd, 353 U.S. 391
(1957). See also Appendixes 1, II, 233 F.2d at 582, 587.
313. Notice particularly the elaborate scheme of affording an immunity from testimony
while at the same time requiring the witness to waive it, see Regan v. New York, 349
U.S. 58 (1955) ; the obvious inadequacy of stating to the jury that the accused's silence
must not be taken as a basis for an inference of guilt-a statement which in itself draws
attention to the possibility of such inference, see State v. Bovender, 233 N.C. 683, 65
S.E.2d 323 (1951) ; and the conflict between the requirement of showing "possible
danger of incrimination," and the incrimination inherent in such showing, see Note, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrhnination in the Federal Courts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1454
(1957).
314. While the law refuses to require a confession, many religions teach that con-
fession, private and public, is both a duty and a virtue. See RIK, RITUAL, PSYCHO-
ANALYTIC STUDIES 167-219 (1931). An advanced view of confession is expressed in
the Talmud which ignores a confession made in court during judicial proceedings but
regards confession made after conviction as part of atonement. See Fairfield, The Prob-
lem of Confessioms: Presidential Address, 25 MEnIco-LFGAL J. 142 (1957).
In primitive society, in which law and religion are not differentiated, the confession
is often one of the chief means of social control, performing a function "similar to that
of our criminal law." See Cantor, Law and Order in Primitive Society, in ENCYCOPEDIA
OF CRIINoLOGY 339, 342 (Branham & Kutash ed. 1949).
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according "voluntary" confessions and declarations against interest high pro-
bative value. Psychoanalysis has shown, however, that man is not an entirely
rational being, and that his sense of guilt does not operate in an unambiguous
fashion. The sense of guilt is not an isolated psychic state related to a single
occurrence. Rather, it is a complex product of human development, dating
from childhood. In addition to the constructive and rational aspects of
conscience, there remains in adult man an irrational sense of guilt, which is
related to his unconscious desires and childhood "sins." These irrational
guilt feelings may, in some cases, attach themselves by association to crimes
which the individual has never committed. He may expressly, or by impli-
cation, "adjudge" himself guilty of the crime of which he stands accused, and
which he did not commit, in order to atone for an entirely different crime,
a "crime" of childhood. 315 And because this sense of guilt is often intense,
he may be the severest judge of his present acts.316 Thus, far from invariably
justifying his action as the reasonable man is believed to do, man sometimes
tends to incriminate himself.
317
Psychoanalytic research has also pointed out the compulsive element in
confession. 318 That element is sublimated in religious confession, which is
"rational" because it affords absolution. Since legal confession, however
"ivoluntary," generally carries no absolution or mitigation in law, it becomes
only a ritualistic performance, an admission of repressed guilt feelings, un-
related to the crime confessed. So viewed, all confessions and self-incrimina-
tory statements may be "involuntary."3 1
The compulsive elements of apparently voluntary self-incrimination and
confession are also present in the oath. Theodor Reik has shown that the oath
is closely connected with the confession ritual. Like confession, he found that
"swearing, oaths and denials are the central point of all complicated compulsive
actions and thoughts and reflections which ... neurotics feel as obsessive."
3 20
The oath is a "social . . . [device] used to blackmail hidden mental mechan-
isms," utilizing "repressed, unconscious contents in which hidden . .. deep
315. FREUD, Psycho-analysis and the Ascertaining of Truth in Courts of Law, in 2
COLLECTED PAPERS OF SIGMUND FREUD 13 (Riviere transl. 1924).
316. "In the case of many persons no worldly judge could reach the severity of the
superego." REIN, Gestdindnisawang und Strafbediirfnis, in PROBLEME DER PSYCHOANALYSE
UND DER KRIM 1NOLOGIE 118 (1925).
317. On the manner in which accusation techniques may induce false confessions see
Bonnard, The Metapsychology of the Russian Trials Confessions, 35 INT'L J. PsYcno-
ANALYsIs 208 (1954). Variations in strength of guilt feelings and the relative severity
of accusations and trial techniques may combine in such a manner as to cause a normal
person to accuse himself falsely. And after all, for the most normal individual, a criminal
charge is a trying experience.
318. See REIK, op. cit. supra note 314, at 213-15.
319. Compulsive acts are "involuntary" in the sense that they are committed because
of an inner need, not consciously understandable, to do what the individual consciously
knows to be irrational.
320. REIc, op. cit. supra note 314, at 195.
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unconscious feelings of guilt . . . sinful thoughts from infancy" are ex-
pressed.321 Thus, any reassessment of the legal rules that differentiate between
"voluntary" and "involuntary" self-incrimination and confession must include
an inquiry into the nature and justification of modem oath practices. Indeed,
the reassessment should begin with the latter inquiry. For, while the compul-
sive elements in self-incrimination and confession are incidental to their pre-
sumed logical modus operandi, these elements are the very reason for the
oath's existence. The oath is a ritual, whereas self-incrimination and confession
merely contain ritualistic components.
An even weightier argument against the oath is the indignity which it
inflicts upon the taker. Compulsory self-incrimination will again serve as an
analogy. Its indignity has been said to lie in the "essential and inherent
cruelty of compelling a man to expose his own guilt," which is contrary to
"the spirit of individual liberty."
3 22
But the indignity of compulsory self-incrimination, whether "compulsory"
in an external, traditional sense, or in a psychological sense, lies not only in
its cruelty, but in the fact that self-incrimination involves, beyond the con-
scious guilt of the declarant, his unconscious compulsive "guilt." Respect
for the dignity of man throws a cloak of privilege around man's innermost
personality sphere.32 He should not be compelled-either directly or by grant of
a waivable privilege-to reveal his unconscious by self-incrimination or con-
321. Meerloo, Thought Control and Confession Compulsion, in ExPLORATIONS IN
PSYCHOANALYSIS 33-36 (Linder ed. 1953).
322. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896). In civil-law countries references
may also be found to "the humiliation of self-denouncement." See BELING, DIE BZ-
WEISVERBOTE ALS GRENZEN DER WAHRHEITSFORSCHIUNG IM STRAFPROZESS 13 (1913). But
these views do not answer the primary question as to why it should be deemed detri-
mental or humiliating for a man to be made a judge in his own case or an informer
against himself, rather than a mere object of judgment or accusation. Surely, it is nobler
and more dignified to be judged by one's own conscience than by the fiat of other men.
Such self-judgment undoubtedly is an incident of self-determination. In fact, the historical
evaluation of the phenomenon of self-judgment or self-accusation has been singularly in-
consistent. At times it has been considered the utmost of justice, at other times the
extreme of injustice. Thus, MUYART DR VOUGLANS, INsTITUTEs DU DROrr cRIlNEL 73-
81, cited in EsmEIN, A HISToIy OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 373 (1913),
spoke of "the peculiar advantage the accused finds in its [torture] rendering him the
judge of his own cause. . . " BECC.&RIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 47
(Gould transl. 1809), praised the jury system as realization of self-government in the ad-
ministration of justice, a system in which "the criminal seemed to condemn himself." But
see, e.g., Memmius, cited in Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE LJ. 1329, 1345-47 (1959). The
exact starting date of the ascendancy of the contrary view has not been determined. As
pointed out by voN LiszT, DIE FALSCHEK AUSSAGE 131-38 (1877), the privilege against self-
incrimination has survived by way of custom, although not supported by a clear and con-
scious justification. Of course, the very fact that it has thus survived shows that it corre-
sponds to a profound human need, which transcends verbalization.
323. The privilege against self-incrimination is a right of privacy, closely related
to the privilege against search and seizure. Brown v. Walker, supra note 322.
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fession.32 4 A similar phenomenon is present in the oath. Because of the com-
pulsive elements of the oath, its administration is an appeal to the taker to
expose usually controlled and hidden wells of his mind. It thus invades
his privacy. The target of this probing is an area of the oath-taker's mind
over which he has no control and of which he has, indeed, no "knowledge."
He is being treated as an "object" and not as a "subject," as part of the world
of "thinghood" and not as a rational man.3 25 Administration of the oath thus
violates man's dignity.
The law of the oath should be reassessed in the light of the contemporary
concept of man and of his dignity. Every legal system is geared to a concept
of man which that particular system visualizes as both the subject and the
object of prescription. 320 The dignity of man varies with the image of man
prevailing in different cultures. For example, human dignity in Judaeo-
Christian ethics differs from the dignity of the "horno econoncus"--the
shrewdly calculating egoist of eighteenth and nineteenth century tradition.
3V
The conception of dignity that corresponds to our present age of science and
psychology, though closer to the Judaeo-Christian ideal, is more complex than
either of these. In the face of atomic annihilation, men have come to realize
the futility of individual self-interest. Increasing self-knowledge has also led
to a realization of the impact of the environment upon our individual develop-
ment. Our individual reality is intensely social, and "sacro egoismo" no longer
serves even our very selfish ends. Awareness of the irrational components
of mind has reduced the "rational man" of past centuries to a fiction. But
rationality, though no longer believed to operate inevitably and mechanically,
has remained the ideal towards which men must individually and collectively
strive. In pursuing this goal, the first step is acquisition of self-knowledge,
upon which knowledge of the external world is predicated. Self-knowledge,
however, is not a guarantee of rationality. Man must also rid himself of his
atavistic and ritualistic traits. Only in this manner can he achieve his best
personal efficiency and thereby also enhance his usefulness to society. This is
the contemporary image of man, and human dignity today is meaningful only
as an attribute of this image. Initial awareness of the potentialities of atomic
destruction and of the role of irrational components even in man's creative
accomplishments has tended to reduce man's self-esteem. Yet, as his efforts
to reach rationality and control of life events meets with success, his self-
324. This interpretation would explain the common-law limitation of the privilege
to personal incrimination.
325. See KANIT, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, in 7 WE=_x 246 (Cassirer ed. 1916);
Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L. REv. 683, 693-94 (1956).
326. See JEScHEcK, DAs MENSCHENBILD UNSERER ZEIT UND Dm STcH TSREOR
(Recht und Staat Nos. 198-99, 1957) ; RADBRICir, DER MExscH Im RE HT (Recht und Staat
No. 46, 1927).
327. But the latter is also a product of religious ideology. See WEBER, Die protestatz-
tische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, in I GESAmELTE AuFsXrzE zUR RE.IGIoNs-
sOziOlOGiE (1922).
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respect grows. The dignity assigned to him by law must take account of this
growing self-respect. Recognizing his growing stature, the law must objec-
tively treat him as a "rational man" in a new sense.328 The modem conception
of man's dignity implies freedom from required participation in rituals which
impede modem man in his strivings toward rationality. He should not be
required to take an oath as an accused, as a civil party, or as a witness.
Moreover, the image of man prevailing in any given culture is reflected in
the image of the state. Like man himself, man's state today ought to have a
conscience 329 and dignity.330 Such dignity precludes administration of an
oath. In order to uphold both its own dignity and the dignity of its citizens,
the state should not participate in oath-taking at all. Thus the state should
refuse an individual's request to be officially sworn, although there can be no
legal objection to a spontaneous oath in court.
When the oath tradition is deeply rooted in culture, a sudden abolition
of the oath practice may cause a serious disruption of legal procedures.
Gradual reduction of oath taking by confining its use to important matters,
and to cases where other means of truth finding are unavailable, would seem
a more desirable course. Several civil-law systems have adopted such a
policy of limiting the oath practice. This policy is expressed in a number
of devices: total exclusion of oaths in certain legal areas, discretionary power
of judges (and of parties) to impose or forego imposing an oath, and use of
the "posttestimonial oath." The latter device would hardly fit the scene of a
jury trial. However, the first mentioned methods might be imitated to ad-
vantage.
In no event should the "oath of the accused" be tolerated even during the
interim period. Administration of such an oath is an open invitation to
perjury, in addition to being a "tortura spiritualis" of the accused. Nor should
an accused be subjected to a questioning as is customary in civil-law countries.
The legislation now in force in Georgia permitting the accused to make a
statement of his choice affords the most commendable solution.
331
Reassessment of the law of oaths should include reevaluation of perjury
legislation. The present tendency to increase perjury penalties and relax the
materiality requirement has resulted from the policy of "governmental think-
ing." This policy is based on the assumption that the state has an abstract
right to man's "truth"-a right that is not dependent on any concrete social
interest calling for protection. This assumption militates against the basic
328. Dignity is thus a dynamic and not a static concept. Moreover, changing concepts
of human dignity require parallel changes in the scope of "due process"-which should
reflect modern notions of individual self-respect.
329. See RADBRUCH, EINFOHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFr 132 (9th ed. Zwei-
gert 1952) (emphasizing the element of "conscience" in law).
330. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
331. See GA. CoDE ANN. § 38-415 (1938) ; Prater v. State, 160 Ga. 138, 143-45, 127
S.E. 296, 298-99 (1925).
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democratic tenet that the state is not the keeper of its subjects' consciences.
Unless a clear social interest can be shown to exist, the state should not punish
a man for abstract lying. And the punishment for lying should be propor-
tionate to the social harm it produces.
Finally, consideration should be given to introduction into American law
of the institution of "perjury in a state of necessity." Among philosophers,
only the most formalistic moralists have advocated strict adherence to truth
at any price.332 Failure to differentiate between the circumstances in which
the false statement is made is incompatible with the demands of exponents of
enlightened penal philosophy for punishment in accordance with the serious-
ness of the individual's particular antisocial act. The privilege against self-
incrimination grew out of the right of an accused to take a purgative oath,
rather than the oath de veritate dicenda (to tell the truth). 33 He was thus
afforded an exemption from the oath that had become a tool of a charismatic,
authoritarian state, which claimed control over man's totality of being. The
democratic state must limit its claim to man's truth to instances of clear su-
perior interest, and it must yield that claim in cases where disclosure of truth
cannot be expected from the individual. Such cases include all those involving
the accused or the suspect, as well as all persons closely connected with them.
With or without oath, no man should be bound by law to make disclosures
which would cause him or persons close to him substantial harm. Man should
be held by law to average law abidance, not to the utmost self-sacrifice.
332. See 8 KANT, GRUNDLEGUNG DER MEMAPHYSIK DER SITr 282-86 (Rosenkranz
ed. 1838).
333. See Silving, The Oath: I, 63 YATE LJ. 1329, 1365-68 (1959).
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